by Brian Whitaker

"Clash of civilisations" is a catchy phrase but also a dangerous myth. As a political idea it doesn't stand up to much scrutiny but it does have a certain appeal to those who like simplistic explanations for the world's problems. The danger comes when people start to believe it and build politics around it.

The phrase itself seems to have been coined in 1990 by Bernard Lewis, president Bush's favourite historian, but the idea was developed a few years later and eventually turned into a full-scale book by an American academic, Samuel Huntington.

Huntington identified a number of so-called civilisations throughout the world - Hindu, African, Latin American and so on - but it was his focus on "western" and "Islamic" civilisations (and the potential for conflict between them) that attracted most attention.

Trying to carve up the modern world in this way is problematic, to say the least. We can talk historically of civilisations - the ancient Greeks or the Incas of South American, for example - but the term "civilisation" not only implies a distinctive culture but also a fairly self-contained and homogenous form of social organisation within geographical boundaries.

Whatever civilisations may have existed in the past, globalisation, air travel and instant international communications make the concept of separate cultural entities far less meaningful today.

Huntington very quickly ran into trouble defining the boundaries of his civilisations and got round it by introducing the idea of "torn" countries - one example being Turkey, which is tugged by both east and west. Looking more closely at the Muslim world, though, it becomes clear that "torn" countries are not so much the exception as the general rule.

What, for example, are we to make of Saudi Arabia? It ought to be firmly in the Islamic camp if Huntington's theory holds good, and yet it's a military ally - and to some extent a political ally too - of the United States.

The same applies to individuals as much as countries. You don't have to look very far in the Middle East to find people who embrace elements of both western and Islamic culture.

In a riposte to the clash of civilisations theory, Edward Said argued that it ignored the interdependency and interaction between cultures. This is even more important today because of globalisation, and particularly the effects of satellite TV and the internet – neither of which were significant factors at the time Huntington developed his idea, though they are now.

None of this is to suggest that there is no conflict, or potential for conflict, between western and Islamic cultures. There is, but it is not an existential struggle between monolithic blocs. The reality is far more complex than that.

The problem with the clash of civilisations theory is that it sweeps aside this complexity and can be used to explain the world in a way that legitimates a certain kind of politics. Its appeal is not just to western Islamopohobes; Bin Laden has adopted it, as can be seen from many of his speeches, along with many other Islamists.

For some in the west, Bin Laden's espousal of the clash of civilisations is evidence of its truth. Websites such as Jihadwatch, for example, treat the jihadist view of Islam as the correct, official version and then accuse anyone who presents Islam in a different light of trying to conceal the sinister truth.

This might not be so dangerous were it not for the after-effects of the Cold War. It is no coincidence that the clash of civilisations theory developed as the Soviet Union was collapsing. The "Soviet threat" had been a constant theme in American politics for 40 years or so and its disappearance caused a vacuum in international politics and consternation among the military-strategic planners: what on earth were they to plan for now?

In those circumstances, one attractively simple solution was to replace the "Soviet threat" with an "Islamic threat" and carry on much as before. This is what some of the neoconservatives actually did, either because they mistakenly believed there were similarities or because they sensed it would be useful to apply the familiar anti-Soviet rhetoric to Islam. It is interesting to note how much of President Bush's language, when he talks about the Middle East and terrorism - the "march of freedom", etc - echoes the language of the Cold War.

The big question, of course, is what can be done about this, and I think it needs to be tackled at various levels. There is one international initiative known as the Alliance of Civilisations which is sponsored by Spain and Turkey, under the auspices of the UN. In a report last week it proposed a number of steps but highlighted, above all else, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which it described as a key symbol of the rift and one of the gravest threats to international stability.

Commenting on the Alliance of Civilisations report, Kofi Annan observed: "We need to get away from stereotypes, generalisations and preconceptions, and take care not to let crimes committed by individuals or small groups dictate our image of an entire people, an entire region, or an entire religion."

This is one of the core issues. We could talk at great length about western stereotyping of Muslims but, since this is basically a Muslim gathering, perhaps we should consider the part some Muslims play in stereotyping themselves and in stereotyping the west. Abu Hamza, the Finsbury Park cleric, was one hothead who looked and acted the part, fulfilling all the expectations the media could ever dream of. There are also plenty of others, including respected Islamic scholars, who characterise the west in ways that pander to the clash of civilisations theory.

More importantly, though, Muslims should take every opportunity to counter generalised perceptions of a monolithic Islam - and the best way to do so is by highlighting their diversity and exploring new ways of interpreting their faith.

This may be controversial, and some would no doubt view it as encouraging discord, but I think it is necessary. Differences of interpretation are not something to be ashamed of, because no particular faction within Islam has a monopoly on the truth. Vigorous, open debate within the Muslim community can break down the stereotyped images and, in the end, provide the best defence against a clash of civilisations.

Around the time that Huntington was carving up the world into conflicting civilisations, another American - Francis Fukuyama - came up with a different idea which in some respects is almost the opposite. Like Huntington, he gave it a catchy title - The End of History" - which was perhaps unfortunate because in the decade-and-a half since he wrote it, history (in the sense of big events) clearly hasn't stopped.

Instead of a clash that divides civilisations, Fukuyama saw them coming together.

"What we may be witnessing," he wrote "is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but … the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalisation of western liberal democracy as the final form of human government."

Fukuyama's basic argument is that democracy will become more and more prevalent in the long term, though there may be many setbacks along the way. He argues this on the grounds that since the French revolution democracy has proven itself to be a better and more effective system (ethically, politically and economically) than any of the alternatives.

There is a lot to be said for this viewpoint though unfortunately - especially in the Middle East - it tends to be associated with imperialism, with the west trying to impose its ideas of what is best for the rest of the world. Much of the blame for that rests with the Bush administration for promoting democracy aggressively but selectively, targeting the regimes it dislikes while ignoring others that are equally undemocratic but more amenable towards the United States.

Nevertheless, a good idea is a good idea, no matter where it comes from. Setting aside questions about the actual mechanics of democratic systems, which obviously can vary from country to country, vast numbers of Muslims accept that any sensible form of social organisation should be based on the will of the majority.

You even find this principle to some extent in Saudi Arabia, where new rules about the royal succession provide for a vote among the royal family in the event of disagreement about who should be king.

I don't think anyone can seriously argue that majority decision-making, as a basic principle, is incompatible with Islam. At the same time, though, I do think there is a serious obstacle to implementing democracy in Muslim countries. The problem is the relationship between religion and the state, and it's difficult to see how democracy can become truly effective unless they are separated.

If we look at the constitutions of the Arab states, almost all of them say, somewhere near the beginning, that Islam is the religion of the state. I have never really understood the need for this: religion, surely, is for people, not states.

In itself this may be a small point, but it is usually the precursor in Arab constitutions to another clause which says that the shariah is a source of legislation, and in some the main source of legislation.

Along with this, there's often the idea that new laws should be vetted, by unelected religious scholars, to ensure that they don't conflict with Islamic principles - or at least Islamic principles as defined by those who do the vetting.

Elsewhere in Arab constitutions we often find a requirement that the head of state must be Muslim, and in some cases a good, observant Muslim.

All this runs counter to one of the basic principles of democracy: sovereignty of the people. The people are not sovereign if an elected parliament can be over-ruled on religious grounds or if candidates for head of state can be excluded on the basis of their beliefs or religious practices.

Beyond the constitution itself, Arab countries often have laws dictating personal behaviour purely on the basis of what Islam supposedly requires - in effect, creating a whole category of religious crimes. The Saudi laws against apostasy and witchcraft are striking examples, but there are plenty of others elsewhere.

Making a clearer distinction between religion and the state would not necessarily rule out any role for the shariah. It is clear that many Muslims want to conduct their personal affairs - marriage, divorce, inheritance, etc - along shariah principles, and I can see no reason to prevent that if the people concerned give their voluntary consent. But it ought to be voluntary, with provision for those who choose to opt out.

Drawing sensible boundaries between religion and state is not going to be easy. We had the same problem with Christianity in Europe and the battles raged for centuries. But it's an issue Muslim countries will have to tackle seriously if they want to move forward politically into the 21st century.

This is an expanded version of a talk given at an event to mark Islam Awareness Week: "One World - The Myth of the Clash", East Ham town hall, London, 22 November 2006.