| YEMEN has long been the odd man
out in the Arabian peninsula: poor, populous and republican in a region dominated by
extraordinarily wealthy but scantily populated monarchies. Alone among the peninsular
states, neither neither part of Yemen had profited directly from the oil boom of the 1960s
and 1970s, and neither had joined the rich states' club, the Gulf Co-operation Council.
These factors, together with southern Marxism, meant that almost any changes emanating
from Sana'a or Aden were liable to be regarded with suspicion by Yemen's neighbours. Thus
in 1990, although the peninsular states formally welcomed unification (since they were
obliged to pay lip-service to Arab unity), in reality they greeted it with a mixture of
coolness and consternation. For some of them, the fact that unity also brought
democratisation made the changes doubly disturbing. Unification
created - at a stroke - the most populous state in the Arabian peninsula, with some 15
million citizens. Saudi Arabia, in contrast, had about 10 million inhabitants of whom,
after discounting the large number of foreign workers, probably no more than four million
were Saudi citizens1. The total population of the remaining peninsular states -
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain and the UAE - was perhaps a little under six million, again
including foreigners2. Population is an unusually sensitive issue in the
region, since the oil-producer states enjoy enormous wealth but lack the human resources
to protect it - as was amply demonstrated in 1990 by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Even
allowing for the approximate nature of available figures, there was no doubt that Yemenis
easily outnumbered citizens of all the other peninsular states combined. Although of
little immediate consequence, the figures provided a reminder of Yemen's potential
importance and had a powerful psychological effect.
The political changes that accompanied unification were no
less disconcerting. In a region where states are normally run along the autocratic lines
of a 19th-century family business, multi-party democracy tended to be perceived as no less
revolutionary and threatening than the old Marxist regime in south Yemen. Firstly, there
were fears that the example - or just the perception - of democratisation in Yemen could
create pressure for similar measures in Saudi Arabia which might easily upset the
stability of the monarchy. Secondly, there was the fear that Saudi democrats or other
opposition groups might look to Yemen for support, and that Sana'a, well aware of Saudi
support for opposition groups in Yemen, might feel justified in providing it. There was
thus a possibility that a vicious spiral would develop in which each country's fears were
constantly fuelled by the other's response.
Unification also came at a time when Saddam Hussein of
Iraq, after the ending of the war with Iran, was adopting an increasingly belligerent
stance towards Kuwait and Saudi Arabia; having fought Iran in part as their proxy, he was
now seeking recompense. Yemen had long-standing relations with Iraq: the original
connections were religious, but the two countries also had economic, military and
political ties. There was a strong element of Iraqi-orientated Ba'athism in north Yemeni
politics, and at an international level the country had tended to align itself with Iraq
rather the Gulf states. President Salih regularly used Iraqi military advisers and his
Republican Guard was modelled on Saddam's. Yemeni troops had fought alongside Iraqis in
the war with Iran.
The formation of the Arab Co-operation Council in 1989,
consisting of Iraq, Yemen, Egypt and Jordan, was seen by some as the birth of a new
alliance which might one day challenge the GCC. There is also no doubt that Saddam
encouraged Yemeni unification - to the extent that some have claimed, in the light of the
invasion of Kuwait a few months later, that it was intended as a building-block in his
regional master-plan. Had the Arab Co-operation Council become a success and also
developed into a military alliance, the Saudis would have had good reason to be alarmed.
As it turned out, however, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (and the international response to
it) forced Yemen's relations with Saddam to be drastically scaled-down - but not without
causing enormous damage in the meantime.
Relations with Saudi Arabia have always been a central
feature of Yemeni foreign policy, not merely because the kingdom is the dominant state in
the peninsula and also Yemen's most important neighbour, but because the Saudis'
perception of their security needs is that they should seek to control Yemen as much as
possible in order to prevent it from becoming a threat. According to this view, Saudi
interests are best served by keeping Yemen "on the wobble" (as one western
diplomat put it3) - though not so wobbly that regional stability is
jeopardised. Before unification, this amounted to ensuring that north and south Yemen
focused their attentions on each other rather than on their non-Yemeni neighbours. For the
strategy to succeed, it was essential to maintain an equilibrium between both parts, so
that neither became dominant. Thus Soviet support for the south was generally matched by
Saudi support for the north, coupled with frequent meddling in the internal affairs of
both parts. The north skilfully exploited this policy to its own financial advantage, but
even so there were drawbacks. Most importantly, it created dependence on the Saudis. Apart
from official aid and unofficial aid (in the form of bribes to various tribal leaders),
remittances from Yemenis working in Saudi Arabia became the mainstay of the northern
economy.
Because of the relative poverty of Yemen, large numbers of
Yemenis have traditionally sought employment abroad. During the oil boom of the 1970s,
many found it in the rich monarchies of the Gulf, but especially in Saudi Arabia. Northern
Yemenis were allowed to enter the kingdom on terms which were easier than those for
nationals of other countries (including the PDRY). They had no need for a Saudi sponsor,
and were allowed to own businesses without the customary Saudi partner. In Sana'a's view
these privileges were not merely a favour bestowed by the Saudis but had a legal basis:
letters exchanged by the Saudi and Yemeni leaders in 1934 at the signing of the Treaty of
Ta'if (which delineated part of the common border) can be interpreted as allowing
relatively unrestricted Yemeni entry into the kingdom4. Naturally, Sana'a made
a point of interpreting them in this way and regarded them as an integral part of the
treaty.
Together with dependants, the number of Yemenis living in
Saudi Arabia probably approached two million at its peak5. Although in the
short term their remittances brought tremendous benefits to north Yemen, the longer-term
effects were more debatable. In the first place, the remittances tied north Yemen's
economy to Saudi Arabia - which meant it would suffer if political relations deteriorated
- and also, to some extent, made it more susceptible to fluctuations in the price of oil
than it would otherwise have been. Meanwhile, the influx of cash into Yemen caused
inflation and huge disparities in wealth where the families who had no members working
abroad were the first to suffer. Agriculture declined as able-bodied workers drifted away
from the countryside, leaving villages populated largely by women and those males who were
either too old or too young to work. Gradually, the delicate system of mountain terraces
began to fall into disrepair, leading to soil erosion and further agricultural decline6.
Even at its best, the relationship between the Saudis and their Yemeni guest-workers was
by no means harmonious: the Saudis, for their part, seem to have feared that Yemenis in
the kingdom might foment opposition to the monarchy7. Yemenis, in turn, also
complained of ingratitude. It was their labour, they said, which had built Saudi Arabia -
without adequate compensation. They had performed many of the jobs that Saudis were
unwilling or too lazy to perform themselves. Many Yemenis complained of discrimination and
harsh treatment in Saudi Arabia. Comparisons are sometimes drawn here with the British
attitude towards Irish labourers. Halliday, for instance, quotes one elderly Yemeni living
in Britain as saying: "The Irish are like the Yemenis. They built London, just as the
Yemenis built Saudi Arabia. No wonder the Saudis and the English get on so well - they
don't do any work"8.
Economic dependence in turn limited the north's freedom to
manoeuvre politically. This is not to suggest that relations with Yemen's neighbour were
always good: there had been periods of tension and even conflict (for example when Saudi
Arabia supported the royalist side during the civil war of the 1960s). Resisting Saudi
influence was a popular cause in Yemen which could be used by the Sana'a government to
bolster its position when faced with domestic difficulties. Both the value of remittances
and the numbers of Yemenis in Saudi Arabia had, however, been falling for some years, so
that by 1990 remittances were less than 30% of their peak level. This was due to several
factors: the decline in construction work in Saudi Arabia, the replacement of Yemenis by
Asian workers (on lower wages), and the fact that as migrant Yemeni workers became more
settled in the kingdom they sent less money to relatives back home9.
For the Saudis, relations with Yemen were only one of many
concerns in a foreign policy which was altogether wider and more complex. Regionally, the
kingdom has six land neighbours besides Yemen (Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, the Emirates, Bahrain
and Oman) whereas Yemen has only two. In the east, across the Gulf, the kingdom faces
Iran, and in the west, Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea. Beyond the peninsula and its
surrounding area, Saudi Arabia's special position as the land of the Prophet, makes it
foremost among the Islamic states spread across Africa and Asia. Wider still, its oil
wealth provides it with considerable influence over the world's economy as a whole.
Nevertheless, relations with Yemen presented a particular difficulty for Saudi Arabia,
mainly because of the long-running border dispute, but also because of political
differences and the suspicion of Yemeni connections among opposition groups in the
kingdom.
After unification in 1990, relations with Saudi Arabia
became the dominant foreign policy issue for Yemen. The simplest and most obvious reason
was that unification removed the previously all-consuming north-south issue from the arena
of foreign affairs, leading the new state to devote more attention to relations with its
neighbour. Meanwhile Yemeni anxieties about the Saudi reaction to unification further
focused attention on relations between the two countries. At about the same time, three
other factors came into play. One was the discovery in Yemen, starting from the mid-1980s,
of modest but useful quantities of oil and natural gas; the second was renewed interest in
the border question and the third was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. All three were linked
to some extent, and in combination they brought a rapid worsening of relations.
OIL
Yemeni oil began to come on stream shortly before
unification: by 1989 the northern fields were producing 200,000 barrels a day10
and proven reserves at the time were estimated at four billion barrels11.
Although modest in comparison with its neighbours' oil resources, this gave Yemen, for the
first time in its history, an independent source of wealth. Economic independence in turn
held out the prospect of greater political independence; it made remittances and aid from
Saudi Arabia less important and opened the way to a less deferential attitude towards the
kingdom. Internally, oil provided a substantial new source of revenue for central
government and, since existing tax revenue was extremely low, this created an opportunity
for Sana'a to increase its control over the whole country by using its funds to benefit
the more wayward tribes, possibly making some of the shaykhs less susceptible to Saudi
bribery12. It was generally assumed that most forms of opposition and political
intrigue in Yemen were funded by the Saudis. There was no documentary evidence for this
but the stories were so widespread as to suggest they contained a good deal of truth. At
the start of the 1990s, the Islah party (rather than the YSP) was considered the main
recipient of Saudi support. Apart from the more straightforward forms of subsidy, the
Saudis appear to have made frequent use of bribes to achieve specific ends - though not
always successfully. During the 1991 constitutional referendum, the men of Sa'ada in the
far north were allegedly bribed to abstain from voting but defied the Saudis by sending
their wives to vote instead13. Later, during the 1994 war, a northern shaykh
told friends he had been bribed by the Saudis to support the southern cause. When asked
why he had failed to keep his side of the bargain, he replied: "The Saudis gave me a
only little money".
Another important effect of oil was to increase pressure
for a settlement of the largely undefined border with Saudi Arabia. The issue had been of
little practical consequence until the mid-1980s when Yemen discovered its first oil close
to the notional line. Shortly afterwards Saudi Arabia began to assert territorial claims
in oil concession areas, apparently to discourage further exploration by foreign companies
under Yemeni auspices14 .In 1991 Saudi forces reportedly chased out a party of
French geologists working in the Hadramaut region15. The following year, the
Saudis sent warning letters to six oil companies operating in Yemen: British Petroleum,
Atlantic Richfield, Hunt Oil, Phillips Petroleum, Elf Aquitaine and Petro-Canada all
received the warnings, according to diplomats in Sana'a. Most of them appear to have
ignored the threats, though BP halted drilling work on a well in the Antufash block in the
Red Sea16.
Although the disputed oil areas were hugely important to
Yemen, the quantities involved were marginal in terms of the Saudis' overall production.
This suggested that Saudi Arabia was less interested in acquiring the oil for itself than
in depriving Yemen of the benefit in order to limit its prospects for economic development
and independence. Possibly the Saudis also feared that Yemen would use its oil wealth to
acquire modern weapons, as had happened for example with Iraq and Libya. Although oil
revenue was unlikely to be sufficient to allow Yemen to build up its armed forces in the
way Saddam Hussein had done, it did mean that for the first time Yemen would have the hard
currency to buy weapons on the open market, should it choose to do so. It is important,
however, not to over-estimate the military threat that Yemen was able to pose. Its
financial resources were modest and likely to remain so; northern and southern forces were
not integrated into a single fighting unit; and the main functions of the armies were (a)
to maintain internal control and (b) provide employment for large numbers of young men.
Nevertheless, the border question was of such crucial
importance to Yemen's future that it was reasonable to suppose Sana'a might be prepared to
fight for it. There was also reason to suppose that in a border conflict Yemen would not
necessarily be defeated, despite the Saudis' superior weapons. The Saudis tend to rely on
foreign mercenaries, who would probably be less highly motivated than the Yemenis, and the
Saudis would have to maintain forces at the far edge of the Empty Quarter, whereas the
Yemenis would have much shorter lines of communication. With the outbreak of conflict over
Kuwait, Yemeni oil assumed even greater importance. Oil revenue became a vital replacement
for the loss of remittances following the enforced return of Yemeni workers from Saudi
Arabia; Yemen also began to consume its own oil rather than exporting it, because of the
UN embargo on Iraqi oil17. This, of course, added to concern over the border
issue.
THE BORDER
Yemen and Saudi Arabia shared one of the longest undefined
borders in the world. Only a small part of the line had ever been agreed: a portion at the
extreme north-western end stretching from a point just north of Midi on the Red Sea coast
to Najran oasis. That was in 1934 under the Treaty of Ta'if, when, after a brief war, two
ethnically Yemeni provinces, Asir and Najran, were ceded to the Saudis. The remaining
eastern portion of the frontier - totally undefined - ran for almost 1,000 miles through
mountains and desert, mostly unpopulated, on the fringes of the Empty Quarter. To the
west, the maritime border in the Red Sea was also undefined, further hampering oil
exploration.
Apart from the need for a settlement created by oil
discoveries, there were a number of reasons why the border question came to the fore
shortly after unification. From the Yemeni standpoint, unification made the mechanics of
border negotiations appear more straightforward than previously because there would be
only one Yemeni government negotiating with the Saudis instead of two. Meanwhile in 1992
the settlement of Yemen's only other land border - with Oman - again tended to focus
attention on the outstanding question of the Saudi border. Finally, the partial settlement
of the border under the Treaty of Ta'if was due to lapse in 1992.18 Thus, by
1990 both parties were beginning to stake out their bargaining positions as a prelude to
talks about renewal.
There were frequent Yemeni claims of Saudi troop movements
in the frontier area. These usually coincided with periods of tension or new diplomatic
moves on the border question19. In October 1990, Saudi Arabia announced plans
to construct a multi-billion dollar "military city" near Jizan at the
north-western end of the border. This was to be one of a series in strategic areas,
designed to house 50,000 officers and men with their families, and was described by Saudi
officials as "a fortified bastion at our gates"20. In 1991 a Yemeni
border post at Baq'ah in north-west Yemen was reported to have been captured by Saudi
troops, though Riyadh denied this21. A bizarre diplomatic incident occurred in
May 1992 when a Saudi weather forecast appeared to claim that the Kharakhayr region of
Hadramaut belonged to the kingdom. As this was the birthplace of Vice-President al-Baid,
it resulted in a stiff protest note from Sana'a22. Further complicating the
issue, about the same time, the Saudis were reported to be offering Saudi citizenship to
some traditionally Yemeni border tribes in Shabwa, Hadramaut and al-Mahara provinces23.
On the Yemeni side, the new unified constitution signalled
a tough, uncompromising position when it stated in the opening sentence: "The
Republic of Yemen is an independent sovereign state, an inviolable unit, no part of which
may be relinquished." The last phrase was an insertion which had not appeared in the
previous YAR constitution. The Yemeni government also did little to discourage speculation
that it hoped to recover the "lost provinces" ceded in 1934, though there is
nothing to suggest that such rumblings were anything more than a negotiating ploy. Yemen's
declared aim was to extend the issue beyond the small area covered by the Ta'if treaty and
to seek a comprehensive border settlement - which now appeared feasible for the first time
as a result of unification.
Despite all the posturing, the border dispute was more
than a mere quarrel between two neighbours; it was a genuinely difficult question
involving many complex and highly technical issues. Both sides had wildly divergent views
as to where the border should lie - at some points on the basis of quite slender and
conflicting evidence. One of the difficulties in resolving this was the number of
different claims made over the years by both regimes or their predecessors. The other was
agreeing on what criteria should be applied: the principle of self-determination was not
applicable in unpopulated areas, and in most parts neither side had a history of local
administration which might reinforce a claim. The respective claims were based on a number
of lines on old maps: the Violet Line, the Hamza Line, the Riyadh Line, the Philby Line,
etc., representing earlier claims which had been rejected by one side or the other. These
lines not only diverged by up to 200 km in places, but also crossed, creating at one point
a small triangle in the middle which appeared not to be claimed by either side.
A further, but related, issue was that the Saudis had long
sought a land corridor southwards to the Arabian Sea (and thence to the Indian Ocean).
Strategically, their oil exports were potentially vulnerable to a military blockade. Their
tankers had to pass through one of three narrow waterways, none of which the Saudis
controlled directly: the Straits of Hormuz in the Gulf, and the Suez Canal and the Bab
al-Mandab at each end of the Red Sea. A pipeline to the open sea in the south would thus
provide extra security. This was not strictly part of the border dispute (since the
corridor was a Saudi desire rather than a claim) though in practice the two issues tended
to be linked.
Shortly before the south achieved independence in 1967
there had been strong suspicions, particularly within the National Liberation Front, that
Britain and Saudi Arabia were plotting an east-west partition in the south, or possibly
even to hand the eastern provinces of Hadramawt and al-Mahra to the Saudis. The idea
originally seems to have been to reduce instability in the region caused by Britain's
withdrawal from the Aden naval base, though it would also have improved the kingdom's
strategic position. After southern independence, Saudi-sponsored subversion in the south
appears to have been aimed at separating the eastern provinces from Aden and the west24.
Although these suspicions were not confirmed, they arose out of a meeting between King
Faisal and Harold Wilson, the British prime minster, early in 1967. They were further
fuelled by the fact that Britain handed the traditionally Yemeni Kuria Muria islands to
Oman shortly before southern independence.
Subsequently, the Saudis proposed the corridor idea to
both Oman and the PDRY - and both refused. In principle Yemen had no objection to a
pipeline; the sticking point was that the Saudis, presumably for security reasons, had
insisted on having full sovereignty over a strip of land on either side of it25.
For a time, one possibility was to locate the corridor between Yemen and Oman, but that
option was closed in 1992 following agreement on the hitherto undefined border with Oman.
It is conceivable that the corridor plan was one factor behind the Saudis' encouragement
of southern separatism in 1994. If the secession had succeeded, granting a corridor would
have been the most obvious way to repay the Saudis for their support.
The poor state of Yemeni-Saudi relations resulting from
the Gulf war made talks on the border issue impossible during 1990 and 1991. They started,
after a decent interval, with a ministerial meeting in Geneva in July 1992 and continued
spasmodically and somewhat half-heartedly, for almost two years. They were broken off on
April 26, 1994, just as the political crisis in Yemen was turning to war.
THE INVASION OF KUWAIT
Less than three months after unification, Saddam Hussein's
invasion of Kuwait presented Yemen with an almost impossible dilemma. It had long-standing
links with Iraq; at the same time, it depended on remittances from Yemeni workers in Saudi
Arabia and the other Gulf states. Whatever Yemen decided to do, it was bound to suffer.
Opting for what it saw as a middle course, Yemen simultaneously condemned the invasion of
Kuwait and opposed the Western intervention, arguing instead for a regional - Arab -
solution. In this it differed little from several other "neutral'' Arab states, but
as the only Arab member of the UN Security Council at the time, Yemen possibly felt it had
a special responsibility on behalf of the Arab world. In any event, it was in a uniquely
exposed position and its behaviour came under special scrutiny.
In the first Security Council vote imposing trade
sanctions against Iraq, which was carried on August 6 by 13 votes to nil, Yemen abstained
along with Cuba. In a second vote on August 25, allowing military enforcement of the
blockade, the voting pattern was the same. Later, Yemen voted against the use of force to
recapture Kuwait and its stance was interpreted in the West as evidence of secret support
for Saddam, and by Saudi Arabia as nothing less than betrayal. Although Yemen declared
that it would observe sanctions (but would not "impede international navigation"
by challenging ships suspected of breaking them), Western diplomats questioned its
sincerity26. A few days before the Security Council's second vote, an Iraqi
tanker, Ain Zalah, had begun to unload crude oil at the Aden refinery, though work
apparently halted as soon as Yemen announced its decision to abide by sanctions. Two other
Iraqi tankers, al-Fao and al-Qadissiyah, arrived empty in Aden after being refused entry
to a Saudi port. A fourth, Baba Gurgur, took refuge in Aden after earlier failing to stop
when US Navy frigates fired warning shots across its bows. Unnamed diplomatic sources
cited by Associated Press also claimed that Iraq had flown 12 captured Kuwaiti fighter
aircraft to Sana'a and that 36 Iraqi warplanes had been stationed in Ta'izz since
mid-June. Yemeni government ministers emphatically denied that there were any Iraqi
warplanes or Iraqi forces in the country. About the same time, the British Consul-General
in Aden, Douglas Gordon, was briefly arrested and then expelled from Yemen for taking
photographs in the port area.
The outcome was that Yemen got the worst of all worlds,
suffering more from the war than any other non-combatant country: UN sanctions cut off its
trade with Iraq and the US cut off its aid (declaring Yemen's vote "the most
expensive no in history"). Saudi Arabia ended all economic assistance to Yemen and
deployed troops in the frontier zone27. In addition, it announced that Yemenis
working in the kingdom must find a Saudi sponsor or business partner or leave the country28.
Almost none of them found sponsors or partners before the deadline, and within a few weeks
some 750,000 people were bundled over the border into Yemen, many of them leaving behind
most of their possessions29. Those who owned property in Saudi Arabia were
obliged to dispose of it quickly, which in most cases seems to have meant selling it for a
fraction of its real worth. Needless to say, the withdrawal of privileges for Yemenis was
interpreted in Sana'a as a breach of the Ta'if treaty.
This amounted to double punishment of Yemen, for not only
did the country suffer a sudden loss of remittances but also faced the problem of
absorbing this huge influx of returnees. In the space of three months, Yemen experienced a
7% increase in its population and a 15% increase in its workforce, severely exacerbating
unemployment. To begin to comprehend the upheaval this caused, in proportional terms one
would have to imagine close to four million British expatriates suddenly arriving at Dover
- jobless and largely homeless.
The luckier returnees drifted back to their cities and
villages. In Sana'a, a year later, they could be seen every morning, sitting by the
kerbside at major cross-roads, hoping someone would hire them for a day's work. Most were
still there by nightfall30. For months, several hundred thousand camped out on
the hot and humid Tihama plain. The Yemeni government, arguing that they should not be
treated as refugees in their own country, provided little comfort - calculating that this
would encourage them to disperse. It worked up to a point. The numbers dwindled gradually,
aided by outbreaks of cholera which at one point were killing 50-60 children every week.
Two years later, however, there were still about 100,000 returnees living on the outskirts
of Hodeida on 1,400 acres of what had previously been waste land. By then, the encampments
were acquiring an air of permanence, as well as bitterly ironic place names such as Saddam
Street, Martyrs District and the Mother of Battles District. Amid the shelters built of
sacking and rubbish, a handful of huts served as shops and there was even one two-storey
plywood house, with an outside staircase and a sagging upper floor. A man who scraped
together the cash to buy an old vehicle had started a bus service. These were the least
fortunate of the returnees. Those with savings, skills or close family ties had moved on.
Those who remained were unskilled, in some cases unemployable - and had virtually nothing.
They told of belongings left behind, of televisions and video recorders sold to Saudis for
a tenth of their value, of refrigerators abandoned along the road. Many of the men said
they had been labourers or porters in Saudi Arabia, reflecting sadly that nobody in Yemen
pays to have bags carried. Some had found casual jobs in Hodeida. Others lived by
collecting leftovers from the back doors of restaurants. Officially, the Yemeni government
provided everyone with bread, though its distribution was later taken over by Islah, for
not entirely charitable reasons, since it regarded the camps as suitable breeding grounds
for political agitation. By no means all of these people had close connections with Yemen.
Some had never previously lived in Yemen; one woman claimed to be a Saudi citizen married
to a Yemeni; others, of distinctly un-Yemeni appearance, were probably of east African
origin. There was little doubt that the Saudis had taken this opportunity to expel not
only Yemenis but anyone else who had no passport and seemed to be a burden on the state:
the blind, the infirm, beggars, plus a few thieves and drug addicts31.
The result of the expulsions was a hardening of attitudes
on both sides. In Saudi eyes, their actions were justified retribution for Yemeni
ingratitude for decades of economic assistance at a level that no other state had come
close to providing32. If the Saudis hoped the expelled Yemenis would blame the
Sana'a government for their plight, they were mistaken. On the streets, in the buses and
cafes, there was vigorous support for Yemen's Gulf stance, coupled with undisguised
admiration for Saddam. Of course the invasion of Kuwait was wrong, they said. But the what
the Americans did was wrong, too. Saddam was a hero - he stood up to them. He didn't win,
but nor was he defeated. There was no way he could win - the Americans fought with
technology, not with their hands like men. Such conversations could be heard all over
Yemen. Interestingly, most of the bitterness was not directed against the Americans
(perhaps because they behaved so predictably) but against the Saudi royal family. Effete,
luxury-loving princes who spent their time in European night-clubs, and proved incapable
of defending their own country without American help, figured strongly in popular gossip33.
Another complaint sometimes heard in Yemen, as in other parts of the Arab world, was that
the Saudis' vast oil wealth belonged by rights to the Arab nation as a whole. By this
argument, the Saudi regime and the rest of the Gulf monarchies, were Western puppets, kept
in power to ensure that the Arab nation remained weak and divided.
However, the deterioration in Yemeni-Saudi relations -
despite the human suffering caused by the mass expulsions - was not entirely negative.
Although many returnees had to leave their belongings behind, others brought large amounts
of cash and equipment into the country. According to one estimate, this was equivalent to
three years' remittances in the space of a single year; it brought a rapid expansion of
construction in Hadramaut and a modest revival of agriculture, most notably in Dhamar
province34. And even if Saudi aid had not been abruptly cut off because of the
war it would probably have declined anyway, since its original purpose - to bolster the
north in its Cold War confrontation with the south - had now gone. As with oil
discoveries, the expulsions reinforced Yemen's political independence vis à vis
Saudi Arabia. One Yemeni economist observed in 1992, "The Saudis did us a favour when
they sent our workers home. They liberated us, but they haven't realised it yet."
Liberation or not, the resulting hardship brought a timely revival of Yemen's national
spirit and obliged the northern and southern leaderships to focus on more urgent matters
than the differences between them.
© Copyright Brian Whitaker |