ABSTRACT 

INTRODUCTION 

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Migdal’s Approach - Monarchical Presidency - Corporatist Praetorianism and Limited Pluralism 

THE ROLE OF TRIBES 
Background - Role in Social Control - Role in Military Security - Role in the Political System - Do Tribes constitute a ‘Strong’ Element of Society? 

THE ROLE OF ISLAMIC GROUPS
Background - Role in Social Control - Role in Military Security - Role in the Political System - Do Islamists Constitute a ‘Strong’ Element of Society? 

SALEH’S RULE 
Military and Security - Politics of Survival 

CONCLUSION 

Acknowledgements 

Bibliography 

Background

Yemen, particularly the former YAR, is a deeply religious society and since unification has seen a growth in so-called Islamist activity. The Islah party with its prominent position in the political system is often taken as evidence of this growth of traditionalist fundamentalism in the country; this is, however, a simplification. As Carapico writes, "Islah…is a thoroughly modern party, critical of many Yemeni religious and folk traditions, but a conservative, anticommunist party valourizing private property, family values, capital punishment…[etc]" [1]. Clearly the role of Islah as a religious party requires further discussion, but one should first clarify the main religious groupings in the country.

The chief sectarian split in Yemen is between Zaydism, found mainly in the northern highlands of the former YAR, and Shafi’ism, found in most of the rest of the country; the former is a branch of Shi’i Islam while the latter is part of Sunnism. While sects have not tended to be as antagonistic towards one another, particularly in recent years, as is often the case in the Middle East, one can note that most of the ruling class are Zaydis. Saleh, for example, is a Zaydi and as is Sheikh al-Ahmar. Islah, which al-Ahmar heads, has come to represent something of a neo-Wahhabism, drawing on Saudi influence, while al-Haqq, the second largest religious party, is a more traditional Zaydi party seeking a return to the rule of Zaydi sayyids. The different status of the two parties can be seen by the number of the seats won by each in the 1993 and 1997 parliamentary elections. Islah gained 63 and 53 respectively, while al-Haqq managed only 2 and then none at all [2].

It is also worth noting the difference between the former north and south Yemens in their attitude towards religion. The north was always more conservative and the YSP was often accused of being atheist and damaging Islam. As Gerd Nonneman has written, "Islamist opposition [to unification] was indicative of the tensions between northern and southern social mores- traditional and markedly religious in the north versus more liberal and secular ways in the south, especially Aden" [3]. Indeed, the PDRY did tend to be more socially liberal; women, for example, enjoyed greater access to employment and political positions in the south and were subject to more liberal personal status laws [4]. The northern victory in the civil war and the influence of Islah saw conservatism spread further through the country.

Outside of political parties, one can also discuss the role of Islamic groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen, founded by Sheikh al-Zindani who is al-Ahmar’s partner in Islah, or even the grouping who were nicknamed Yemen’s Islamic Jihad, run by Sheikh al-Fadhli [5]. The role these all play in state-society relations shall be examined and one can ask if Islamic groups, like tribes, have also become part of Saleh’s corporatist system. Abdul Rahman Ali al-Jifri, the exiled leader of the Sons of Yemen League said, with noted personal bias, "Ali Abdullah Saleh presents himself to the world, and especially to Egypt, as someone who is capable of resisting extremism, whilst domestically he has been encouraging this very extremism" [6]. Clearly, one must establish to what degree Saleh is attempting to, and how successfully he does, co-opt Islamic groups or parties into the patronage network and into the limited pluralism over which he dominates.

Role in Social Control

Islam does, certainly, play a major role in the lives of Yemeni citizens, but one can question whether Islamic groups operate any sort of effective social control. In line with al-Jifri’s statement, Carapico has claimed that Saleh encouraged the Islamists in the late 1980’s as a counter against leftist elements in the north who sympathised with the PDRY [7]. This was something he continued in the united Yemen, "Salih did set the religious right against both the northern leftists and the Yemeni Socialist Party, helping to propel Islamist ideologue Abd al-Majid al-Zindani…into one of five seats on the ruling presidential council" [8]. One can see the growth of social conservatism in Yemen and, indeed, the rivalry between Islah and the YSP can be viewed partially in this light. This must also consider Islah’s links with more extreme fundamentalist groups such as the Islamic Jihad organisation.

Islah represents a type of coalition between moderate Islamists, radical Islamists, tribal leaders and some conservative businessmen; this collection of interests has prevented it from becoming a real ‘fundamentalist’ party. Indeed, its two main leaders al-Ahmar and al-Zindani are by no means the same. Ahmar is not an Islamist but rather a social conservative who has made a political alliance with Islamists such as Zindani and it is an alliance that has served him personally very well.

One of the first disputes between the YSP and Islah in the united Republic was whether Islam should be the sole, rather than the main, source of legislation. Islah and Islamist groups were angered that Article 3 of the constitution did open the way for other sources of legislation, but this was something they managed to change after their enhanced position following the civil war (see below). A further dispute was over the so-called ‘scientific organisations’ that were operated by religious groups; they were presented by Islamists as educational institutes, however, the socialists saw them as a front for the training of militants. In 1992 the YSP introduced legislation to bring an end to these institutions and this met with a great deal of opposition from Islah and there were increased attacks on YSP members. One should note that at this time the YSP still enjoyed a high standing in the polity due to the almost 50-50 split of political roles between themselves and the GPC after unification; it was only after Islah’s success at the 1993 elections and the defeat of the YSP in the civil war that Islah could push a more conservative agenda.

In this early period of unity, Islamist groups lacked institutional reach in society, they did not have the structured framework of the tribes and so often tribal and Islamist actions were linked. This can be highlighted by the alliance of Ahmar, Zindani and Fadhli. As Watkins writes, "The full history of the relationship between the al-Islah party and the Islamic Jihad Organisation has yet to be written. But, in a broad outline, they appear to have been partly overt and partly covert partners joined by the common aim of undermining the former rulers of the Marxist south" [9]. In his argument they were linked not just by Islam but by tribalism as well in that Zindani and Ahmar (but not Fadhli) had tribal links through Hashid; these tribal links could also be extended to President Saleh. He claims, "It thus appears…that Shaykh Zindani and his followers were duped into providing an Islamist front- and thus popular support- for what was essentially tribal opposition to the YSP" [10]. He is overstating the case somewhat, it was not simply that the Hashid confederation was opposed ideologically to the socialists and their leaders expressed this; it was the case of the top elite of the north seeking to destabilise their rivals for power. Most Hashidi tribesmen were as divorced from this decision as anybody.

Once again, more fundamentalist Islamists such as Zindani and Fadhli were allowed to express their views and gain the loyalty of their followers within the limited pluralism that exists in Yemen but Saleh ensures the leaders are co-opted in a safe way. The GPC adopts some of Islah’s policies, such as conservatism on polygamy or the sale of alcohol, in order to strip them of their ability to use the Islamic card on a larger political scale, as they had done against the YSP. Saleh has also used al-Haqq in order to underline his control, for example after the 1997 elections, the Awqaf (Islamic endowments) portfolio was given to al-Haqq rather than Islah, something of a slap in the face for his partners.

Petrodollars, particularly money coming from Saudi Arabia, have boosted neo-Islamic organisations in the Republic. Most of this money has gone to Islah and much of it used on social services, especially in the south, as Saif writes, "[Islah] took the initiative to help people in the South. It filled gaps in the social services: health care, emergency relief, post-secondary vocational training, religious education…These projects…reached many thousands of lower income families" [11]. While this may seem to be deepening Islamist penetration of society it can also benefit the regime, as Carapico writes, "In cushioning society from the ravages of corrupt economics, they also helped cushion the government form popular discontent" [12]. Once again Saleh’s regime has allowed enough activity to bring benefits and legitimation to his regime, yet he has ensured that the Islamists own patronage links run back to leaders who are within his own elite or client-network.

Role in Military Security

Islamic groups have not been armed to the extent of the tribes, but in a society where weapons are so widely available there is clearly a risk that this could occur; indeed, as Hassan Abu Taleb has written, "The civil war was a golden opportunity for fundamentalist groups to acquire a de facto legitimate position across the whole of the country and seize military stocks" [13]. Al-Fadhli’s organisation especially, was violently mobilised against the YSP. Prior to the civil war his Jihad Organisation made up to a large extent of veterans of the Afghan war carried out terrorism against the socialists, including assassinations of party members and relatives of Ali Salem al-Baydh [14]. However, Zindani and even Ahmar made emotive calls for Jihad against the YSP prior to 1994 and Watkins believes this, in part, encouraged the civil war.

While the tribes did not officially take part in the war, Islamic elements were much more vocal and this was due in large part to the feeling of differences of culture and beliefs with the YSP. This is interesting in the context of Saudi Arabia being a patron to Islamic groups because they had given much support to al-Baydh in order to encourage separatism and a weakening of Saleh’s regime. What this highlights is that various Islamists have different aims, views and leanings, much like any other group and are not the homogenous unit the western press often paints them as. Some Yemeni Islamists look more towards Saudi Arabia, others to Turabi in Sudan or to other Muslim Brotherhood organisations in the Arab world.

After the civil war, Fadhli declared that the destruction of the YSP as a political power meant that the Jihad Organisation had achieved its aim and no longer had reason to exist. Islah, however, felt that its support for Saleh during the war, combined with its performance in the 1993 elections should give it a greater say in the political system, particularly in social legislation.

Role in the Political System

Ever since the first Parliamentary elections in 1993, the Islah party has been second only to the GPC in terms of seats won and given that the YSP lost almost all its power following the civil war, one would expect to see a growth of power that could restrict Saleh. As already mentioned, Saleh did encourage the Islamists as a counter to the socialism of the YSP and indeed, the GPC and Islah co-operated a great deal; Dresch and Haykel claim that, "During the 1993 elections, it was said, no less than seventy Islah candidates withdrew in favour of GPC candidates, while thirty people elected in the name of GPC were in fact Islah supporters" [15].

Islah competed in the 1993 elections with the slogan ‘The Quran and the Sunna Supersede the Constitution and Law’ clearly placing itself opposed to the more radical change to the system the YSP wanted. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Islah did run both religious and tribal candidates and al-Haqq also ran sixty-seven candidates who Detalle describes as a "veritable who’s who of sayyid families" [16]. The success of Islah was notable in that they achieved more seats than the YSP, 63 as compared to 56, however, they were a completely northern party, failing to take even a single seat in the former PDRY. Again the limited pluralism of the system worked to Saleh’s advantage because the GPC, though mainly northern, came closest to being a national party and the relatively high level of participation in the elections help legitimate his rule [17].

Islah did increase its power, it was given increased representation in the executive and Zindani gained a seat on the five man Presidential Council. After the civil war one would expect this to have been built upon but this was not the case, "Islamist aspirations were soon dashed and, indeed, it seems that those aspirations had been deliberately unleashed only to serve the interests of the Saleh regime" [18]. What became clear was that Saleh had used the Islamists and Islah for a specific purpose and while he would not attempt to push Islah out of all influence, which would have damaged his corporatist system, his actions underlined his own dominance.

Article Three was changed so Islam was made the sole source of legislation and a new article (article fifty-nine) was created to make defending religion a sacred duty. However, rather than really moving power towards Islamists, Saleh was merely placating them and recognising, as he usually does, his need to negotiate. He acted very quickly to rehabilitate the YSP, minus its chief leaders, because he did not wish the right to gain too much strength. Indeed, he dissolved the Presidential Council, thus pushing Zindani out of his influential position. The fact that Islamist elements are not unified in ideological orientation or external alliances made it harder for them to put pressure on Saleh’s regime; Islah has attempted to gloss over the differences between Wahhabis, Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood and so on, that exist within the party. The Islamic groups did not act to create strong societal organisations against the state. They have been allowed to operate basically within the framework of Saleh’s patronage network and as Carapico writes, "The re-Islamicization of a deeply religious, homogenously Muslim culture is also government policy…like Riyadh, Sana’a uses religion to justify repression, arbitrary justice, and summary executions" [19].

Do Islamists Constitute a ‘Strong’ Element of Society?

One can argue that, in fact, Islamist forces have been encouraged in order to strengthen tribal leaders’ and, ultimately, Saleh’s position and power throughout the country. Islah are part of the corporatist system and both Zindani and, especially, Ahmar are part of Saleh’s network. Dresch and Haykel are correct in writing, "the style of politics in which Islah’s leaders took part was that associated with the President’s GPC, a style of patronage and connections rather than of ideology or of activists as vanguard of the masses" [20]. Thus, leaders of Islamist groups, like tribal leaders become somewhat disassociated from their larger constituency and more concerned with their own proximity to power or business deals. Islah’s business and tribal elements are strong forces for conservatism and preserving the status quo, stopping the party from becoming too radical. They do not represent societal resilience in a Migdalian manner because of this defence of the status quo, which Saleh too is defending.

It is not to say that Saleh has not been wary of their potential for increased power in society. Drawing on Saif’s work once more, one can note that the President did work to reduce the growing power of the fundamentalist wing of Islah. He co-opted some of their more moderate leaders into the GPC using non-merit appointments and also attempted to draw their scientific institutions into the state education system in order to reduce their influence. Similarly, militias were banned and Saleh worked to improve relations with Saudi Arabia to try to reduce support for fundamentalist groups. It would appear that Saleh has been relatively successful in containing any threat they may pose to his rule. As with tribes, action seems constricted to random acts of terrorism such as the bombing of the USS Cole or the British embassy; acts that are not a real challenge to Saleh himself.

The YSP boycotted the 1997 elections because of a rumour that the GPC and Islah had made a deal to fix the results so as to win 160 and 80 seats respectively. In actuality, the GPC won 188 and Islah only 53, less than it had achieved in 1993. In the wake of this no Islah members were given cabinet posts and al-Haqq took the Awqaf portfolio. Clearly, Saleh is secure enough to keep Islah out of direct power without fearing them mobilising against him violently. The constitutional reforms of 2001 did bring Islah into more vocal opposition in that they campaigned, unsuccessfully, for a ‘no’ vote to the reforms. However, in the main they have been a type of co-opted opposition, this is something which occurs in much of the Arab world. As Zartman writes, "the stability of contemporary Arab regimes can be partly explained by a complementarity of roles, expectations and activities between government and opposition which provides support for the polity" [21]. Indeed after the elections Saleh had commented on the apparent falling out with Islah saying, "This had only occurred because of election fever, we will be back together and our coalition with Islah will continue" [22], it is interesting though that he also stressed there would be no coalition cabinet. A ‘coalition’ in Saleh’s definition is very much a controlled one.

FOOTNOTES