A
FREE and openly competitive election would have marked
another milestone in the development of Yemeni democracy.
But, as in other newly
democratising countries, the theory has proved a lot simpler than the practice ...
YEMEN now finds itself in the bizarre position of holding
a presidential contest in which both candidates are members of the same political party,
the ruling General People's Congress (GPC).
This has come about mainly because of the way the
electoral rules are constructed. To guarantee a competitive election, the constitution
insists that there must be at least two candidates. But the constitution also also
requires that nominees must be approved by at least 10% of the members of parliament.
Only two parties - the GPC and the Yemeni Islah Party -
had a sufficient number of parliamentary seats to approve candidates (see 1997 election results). Islah decided not to
contest the election and declared its support for President Salih, whose party is the GPC.
|
COMMON SENSE
Hassan al-Haifi of the Yemen Times listens to what bus passengers think. If
you read nothing else about the election, read this. |
|
The Yemen Socialist Party (YSP) did want to field a
candidate. But because it boycotted the 1997 general election, it had no members of
parliament and so could not ensure approval of its nominee. At one stage there was talk of
the GPC "lending" the Socialists enough members of parliament to approve a YSP
candidate, but this came to nothing.
A further 23 presidential nominees also
failed to secure parliamentary approval.
The two approved
candidates were Ali Abdullah Salih, the incumbent president, and Najib Qahtan
al-Sha'bi, son of a former president of south Yemen (before unification with the north).
Both are members of the GPC, though Mr Sha'bi is standing as an independent.
PRESIDENT Ali Abdullah Salih has held power in Sana'a
since 1978 but he has never before been elected by a vote of the people. He is genuinely
popular with many (but certainly not all) Yemenis. The opposition is divided and there is
nobody who could seriously hope to defeat him at the polls.
Salih's victory is therefore a foregone conclusion. In
effect, the election is not so much a contest to decide who will be president as an
attempt to legitimise his position and to measure his approval rating among the public.
However, it may not achieve either.
The weakness of the president's opponent means that
legimitacy is unlikely to be much enhanced by the result.
Also, because this is the first direct election, there is
no yardstick against which the level of approval for the president can easily be measured.
But, given the ineffectiveness of Mr Sha'bi's campaign so far, President Salih ought to
secure well over 80% of the popular vote. Anything less than that could be a sign that his
popularity is fading.
Another indicator will be the number of people who turn
out to vote. In the 1997 parliamentary
election, 2,827,261 people voted (representing 41% of those eligible to vote
and 61% of those registered). That election - like to present one - was conducted in the
face of a Socialist boycott. A lower turnout this time would reflect a lack of enthusiasm
for the president or the way the election has been conducted. |