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Structure of control in the pre-unified Yemens

• The PDRY: control and transformation of society; internal rivalry
• The YAR: the Iryani/Hamdi period; the Salih era

The politics of the Interim Period

• Rivalry of elites; politics of survival

Elections and power imbalance

The war road, power redistribution

• Factors that led to the dominance of the GPC

UNDOUBTEDLY, the concept of a unified Yemen was the supreme goal at both official and public levels in both the former Yemens. In addition to the historical and the emotional expectations, the vision of union was also viewed as the proper way towards a better future in the light of socio-economic circumstances. However, before further analysis of post-unification, the strategies and techniques followed by the two states of Yemen in the pre-unification period, which aimed to manage society and control the social order, should be studied. This is an important aspect as it reflects in the politics of the unified Yemen.

The PDRY:

With a population estimated at only 1.5 million, the PDRY presented two different pictures. On the one hand, was the cosmopolitan city of Aden with its urban focus. Ship chandlering, bunkering, oil refining and other large-scale economic and commercial operations generated a certain affluence that in its turn produced a better education system by regional standards and developed a skilled labour force, and to a lesser extent the other main seaport al-Mukalla. On the other hand, was the more rural hinterland, where tribal social structure was predominant [McClintock: 199].

The South Yemeni State emerged in 1967 out of the victorious struggle against British colonial rule¹. The ruling party had been founded in 1959 in Aden as a branch of the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM). The North Yemen revolution of September 26th 1962 paved the way for the local branch of the ANM to form the National Liberation Front (NLF) in August 1963. Subsequently, in 1978, it transformed itself into the Yemeni Socialist Party YSP [Deeb: 452].

The radical ideology of the YSP was the product of certain historical conditions, that were both local and regional. Although the Marxist-Leninism of the YSP is a borrowed ideology, its adoption was accelerated by political and ideological developments in other parts of the Arab World. It also had a local dimension which was rooted in South Yemen society itself [Ibid.: 452]. The members of the nine organisations that formed the NLF were drawn mainly from the petite bourgeoisie which was influenced by the great ideological ferment of the 1950s and 1960s with the demand for independence and the abolition of the quasi-feudal and tribal systems. This trend, enhanced by a well-organised trade union organisation, the Aden Trade Union Congress ATUC, acted on behalf of workers interests [Kostiner, 1981: 454].

The vast majority of the people backed the NLF and other national independence movements against traditional power centres, as the Sultans (rulers of the Southern Arabian Shaykhdoms), Sada (religious seniors, who were descendants of the Prophet) landowners, tribal leaders. There were, also, elements of the newly formed strata of educated officials, who hoped for modernisation and the alleviation of poverty[Ibid.: 454].

Nevertheless, there were four reasons for the shift to Marxist-Leninism. Firstly, there was the 1967 relapse and the Nasser defeat, which inclined the ANM to a radicalisation away from the Nasser streamline. Secondly, the closure of the Suez Canal during 1967 affected the port of Aden, the main source of revenue at a very critical time for the nascent state. The NLF attempted to strengthen ties with the USSR, Eastern Europe and China, who at the peak of the Cold War, provided various types of developmental and military aid. Thirdly, there was a power struggle within the NLF and the country as a whole, in which the faction supporting President al-Sha'abi relied mainly on tribal elements, that feared other NLF leaders, remembering the experience of North Yemen when conservatives dominated the republican regime. Finally, there was not a significant upper bourgeoisie to resist such a trend and the army and police force, which were products of the colonial era, were neither sufficiently united nor strong enough to challenge the radical trend [Deeb: 454].

Control and transformation of society

There were two turning points in the political structure's consolidation of its control. The first, was in 1969 when power was settled to the advantage of the left wing. The second, also came after an ideological conflict in 1978, which was followed by the establishment of the YSP in which the commitment to Marxism was more explicit². Both these events were followed by further tendencies towards centralisation [Abu-Amr: 170-75].

The first turning point came after independence in 1967, the rural ruling class was destroyed: the rulers, landowners and tribal leaders were expropriated and the influential urban classes, primarily the commercial bourgeoisie and the upper section of the colonial state apparatus either fled or were stripped of their economic and political power [Halliday, 1979: 4]. These old classes were substituted by alliances of new and heterogeneous social forces: members of the intelligentsia, workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie and also some of the national bourgeoisie [Abu-Amr: 171].

A second tool of control was agrarian reform, which gave the leadership a great power to mobilise the people. The first Agrarian Reform Law (no. 27) of 1970, decreed the immediate confiscation without compensation of the land and properties of the old classes. The law also limited land ownership to 25 acres of arable land and 50 acres of non-arable land. The second agrarian reform bill was more radical, lowering land ownership to 20 acres of irrigated land and 40 acres of land watered by rain. A peasant militia was armed and took on the implementation of the agrarian reform law. Peasants committees were headed by members of the political organisation of the NLF. These peasant committees confiscated land and redistributed it among the new owners who regrouped into co-operative farms [Ibid.: 177].

The third step in this move against the old centres of control was the nationalisation of all means of production, which came into effect with Law 37 of November 27th, 1969. The key to the new economic system was central planning. The state controlled all sectors of the economy, even the retail sector. Considerable efforts were made to mobilised the society and prevent the control of power from leaving the leading party. Therefore, greater equality of income was applied after the reductions in salaries and wages of the 1968-1972 period. Also, the position of women was transformed within the framework of the Orthodox Socialist Programme which was organised by the Family Law of 1974; a women's organisation established and had branches throughout the country. This was totally controlled by the party [Halliday, 1979: 7-9].

The fourth means of control was the establishment of a centralised communist party. The NLF had transformed into the YSP in 1978. The state apparatus was very much under the control of the political leadership. Party functionaries who played an active role were located at every level throughout the country. Unlike in other Arab regimes, the top state officials were not drawn from the army and the party was an independent force that controlled the state apparatus itself [Ibid.: 4-10]. The army played a less prominent role in public life than it did in other Arab countries. A paramilitary force had been established since 1973. This was a people's militia, which was based on the place of residence, involving about 100,000 people; 60 per cent were peasants, 30 per cent were workers and the other 10 per cent were local and regional commanders who had strong loyalty links with the party. The other important apparatus was the state security, which was so strongly linked to the party and had such a great influence on society that it was hard to distinguish between class struggle from sordid vendettas [Abu-Amr: 178].

Beyond the party, were the mass organisations such as the General Union of Yemeni Workers, the Democratic Yemeni Youth, the General Union of Yemeni Women, the Peasant Organisation, Popular Defence Committees and other groups which were all organised, legitimised and influenced by the leading party. Those organisations filtered to even the remotest villages in the country thus ensuring that all aspects of the party's policies were implemented, regulating and redirecting daily behaviour by this means.

Finally, the regime attempted from the outset, to marginalise the role of Islam in order to diminish its capacity to mobilise the people. After independence, the first few years were characterised by violence against the country's religious establishment. The NLF inspired an uprising that resulted in the public humiliation, torture and killing of numerous clerics during these years. In 1970, the regime nationalised all the religious endowments which had contributed to the independence of the clerics and influenced society. Since then, the state had paid the salaries of appointed clerics and had sought to channel all the funds for mosques from foreign sources through official government bodies [Cigar: 185].

However, in the late 1980s, government leaders appeared to temper their aggression against Islam following advice from the Soviet Union³. As a result, leaders appeared at public prayers on Holy Days and the media carried reports of their meetings with Ulama (jurists) all of which was part of restoring support for the regime as it sought for regional aid. As a part of its amended strategy, the regime sought to show that Islam and Socialism were compatible. The co-opted clerics translated all the state's decisions into every day life⁴.

In sum, the party destroyed all the major power centres and had a massive influence on the society. The party's weakness had emerged from within, where internal rivalry among its leaders marked its history.

Internal rivalry

The YSP had assumed such massive control over society that there were no counter power that could challenge its dominance. Paradoxically, throughout its existence, the NLF and then the YSP, were marked by factionalism. After independence, there was an initial intra party conflict between the quasi-Nasserite faction under President al-Sha'abi and the Marxist-Leninist left. The latter came to power with a bloodless coup on 22nd June 1969 [Halliday, 1986: 37].

In 1978, another major factional conflict broke out. On June 26th, 1978, President Salim Rubaya Ali tried to seize power against the majority of those on the Central Committee, where he was defeated. His successor Abd al-Fattah Ismail, after less than two years in office, was ousted in a bloodless change in April 1980. The factional conflict within the YSP culminated in a ruthless civil war in January 1986, which resulted in the exile President Ali Nasser Mohammad. He was succeeded by Ali Salim al-Baydh who was involved with the process of union with the YAR in 1990.

Such struggles resulting from the rivalry between top leadership is characteristic of the history of the YSP, which contributed to the politics of the unified Yemen as will be seen. Yet, one of the explosive issues that led to the crises of 1969, 1978 and 1986 was that of

the promotion and demotion of officers, indicating that the factional disputes within the civilian political apparatus found a continuing reflection inside the armed forces themselves [Halliday, 1979: 10].

Despite all the ideological propaganda the tribal factor was still important. In a predominantly peasant society, tribal loyalties survived even into urban life. Recruitment for the party, militia, border guards and so on, invariably took on tribal dimensions and such allegiances were clearly visible in all conflicts [Halliday, 1986: 39]. All disputes were seen as a streamlining of the ideological path, and against those who tried to deflect the trend of the Scientific Socialism. The assumption might however be true, that the top leadership prompted by both external and internal economic and political pressures tended to adopt a real politic or pragmatic strategy, which always were exploited from rivals and viewed as individualism and opportunism by rivals anxious to bring about an abdication.

The YAR:

The leadership which created the revolution of 26th September 1962 in the North Yemen, was preoccupied from the outset by the necessity to create a state that could maintain public security and provide a minimal level of services. The previous theocratic state had insulated Yemeni society from the modern world before the coup. Government as a set of offices was almost non-existent; so bureaucracy had little power to regulate the behaviour of citizens or to extract resources and use them in productive ways. For example, the Imam (the ruler) relied on levy from the tribes in times of need, for there was no real standing army. As a result, the tribal leaders were more the allies than the subjects of the Imams, and traded arms and allegiance for a virtual autonomy in their lands [Dresch, 1989: 227-8]. The new leaders then had to create a bureaucracy that could meet minimum needs of the people.

After the revolution, the country was wracked by a civil war between the royalists, who were backed by the Saudis, and the Republicans, who were supported by the Egyptians under Nasser. The balance of power between the tribes at the periphery and the state at the centre tipped towards the tribes in the civil war. The Yemen was quickly divided between the republicans and the royalists, with the tribes securing subsidies and autonomy by playing the two competitors for the state off against each other [Burrowes, 1992: 43].

The new leaders then were always concerned about public security and of balance political power of the tribes in order to keep order. The YAR which was created in 1962, lacked an articulated political mechanism and an organised support base, so that tasks of state-building lagged behind the maintenance of order and security, resulted in the failure to create an effective capacity to monitor, influence and control the rate and direction of socio-economic changes. Since then, the tribes have been extensively involved in politics, and this has made politics of control difficult.

The Iryani/Hamdi period

The Egyptian withdrawal from the Yemen in 1967, quickly led to the overthrow of President al-Sallal, and these events opened the way to a reconciliation between republicans and royalists that finally marked the end of the civil war in 1970. The price paid was the rejection of the left modernist trend of the revolution.

In 1970 a modern Constitution was adopted. Some of the ministries and other agencies established after revolution were strengthened in order to improve the power of the central authority. Among them the Yemeni Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Ministry of Finance. The Central Bank was set up and the Central Planning Organisation was founded. Economic needs caused President al-Iryani to focus on financial and economic institutions rather than on the military, but this regime was eventually ousted by a military coup under accusation of corruption and ignorance of the country's security [Ibid.: 45].

President al-Hamdi, who forced President al-Iryani into exile in 1974, believed in the concept of a modern state and worked to realise it. He promoted the creation or reform of state institutions at the centre, initiated the major reequipment and reorganisation of the armed forces and fostered at a popular level an ideology of development and the idea of exchanging the benefits of state-sponsored modernisation for allegiance to the state. He sought, in other words, to create and strength the power of a new centre.

One aspect of the reconciliation between republicans and royalists the granting of high office and positions of influence to leading tribal Shaykhs, both had been in the central government, and over the fragmented tribally based army. This enabled them to block attempts to strengthen the state in relation to the tribes, resulting in the weakened position of all advocates of a strong state [Ibid., 1988: 224-36].

As a result, Al-Hamdi was unable to strength his position while the Shaykhs a key power centres protected the tribal system. So he moved swiftly to drive them from the Consultative Council (CC) and from other institutions of the state. He dissolved the Constitutional Council and suspended the 1970 Constitution. The tribes responded with a virtual rebellion. The President attempted to compensate for this loss of support by the creation of a centripetal force through reincorporating the modernist left. This attempt to create a more broadly based centre-left coalition involved three initiatives: the Local Development Association (LDA); the correction movement; and a general people's congress. The LDA, launched formally in 1974, held out the promise of a nation wide grass-roots organisation . The correction movement which was revived in 1975, offered a means to train and to place political cadres at all levels of the state. The general people's congress was hit by the assassination of the President in 1977, reverse dirty tricks, according to Migdal's definition [Ibid., 1992: 46].

The Salih era

Salih followed the 8-month tenure of Ahmed al-Ghashmi, who like al-Hamdi before him, was assassinated. In the late 1970s, the fortunes of the Salih regime reached their lowest point and many observers were confidently predicting its imminent demise. Indeed, the CIA station chief in Sana'a was taking bets and giving good odds that President Salih would not survive the spring [Ibid., 1987: 94].

Yet he did survive, and began to expand his control. Salih's regime gradually increased the capacities of the state both in the provinces and in the cities, improving civil services and state agencies. At the same time, the armed forces were reformed, enlarged and reequipped in 1979, 1986 and 1988. The successful introduction of conscription, coupled with professional training for the officer corps, strengthened the military in both the ranks and at the top. These gains were only partly compromised by the new privileges and presumptions of the military in general and by the officers appointed from President Salih's own tribe in particular, nonmerit appointment used as tools of survival [Ibid., 1992: 47].

The regime used rewards and sanctions to increase its presence and authority. After rebuilding the army, he created the Republican Guards, which was a new military agency, completely separate from the army and commanded by the President's brother. These troops were recruited mainly from the President's own tribe. It was given sophisticated weapons and wide privileges to counterbalance any threats that might come from the army. The security apparatus was also expanded and modernised. In addition, the President established a force known as The Central Security Troops, which were commanded by another of his brothers. All these agencies were commanded by brothers or other relatives of the President in a non-merit appointment as described by Migdal, in which enabled the President to monopolised the capacity for mobilisation. After consolidation of his power, Salih controlled the country by rewards and sanctions, giving privileges to the key power centres (the Shaykhs). He also punishing those who did not obey and took armed actions such as that against the tribes in the eastern areas in the late 1980s.

The regime conceived and carried out an impressive programme of political construction during the first half of the 1980s. This programme began with drafting of the National Pact, which then became the subject of a long national dialogue. Elections for the 1000 commissioned members of General People's Congress (GPC) were held in the summer of 1982 for the purpose of adopting the National Pact. The GPC declared itself a permanent political organisation, which would be selected every four years and be led by the 75 members of the Standing Committee which was headed by President Salih [Ibid., :50].

This political structure did much to strengthen the regime. It provided a political process, which was largely defined and managed by a regime into which elements of the Yemeni left could be safely incorporated. In 1985, through the quite open and honest elections of 17,500 members of Local Councils for Co-operative Development (LCCDs), which were a new institutions created out of a merger of the old LDAs, and worked at ground levels throughout the country and assumed responsibility for the implementation of state policies [Ibid.: 50].

Another step taken by the President Salih to generate support and legitimacy, beginning in 1979, was the ingathering of leading political exiles, internal as well as overseas. Salih invited them all back. Ex-presidents al-Sallal and al-Iryani accepted the invitation to come home from exile in 1982. Political returnees included many leading modernists and technocrats. Most of them became members of the three governments formed between 1980 and 1988.

Finally, the expansion of the Presidential Council in 1988 gave additional posts to a broad array of groups and tendencies. Most leaders were co-opted into the regime in one way or another by the late 1980s in a successful series of accommodation processes [Ibid.,: 51].

The Yemeni unification was proclaimed in May 22nd 1990, after a series of meetings between the President Salih and the Secretary General al-Baydh. Despite talks about different types of federation or even a confederation, it was decided to merge the two Yemens into a unitary system. The reasons for the rush to unity, that the two ruling parties were worried that opponents of the merger would grow in strength as time passed. Opponents in the North included many of the conservative tribal leaders and Islamists in the urban areas. Opponents in the South included some who feared that the more conservative North would roll back the southern progressive approach. The most influential was the spectre of Saudi Arabia, backing the conservative tribes and far from enthusiastic about creating on its border a potential strong unified state. Also, Iraqi pressure, before the invasion of Kuwait, was involved in the precipitated union of the Yemens.

The Yemeni leadership, therefore, hoped to address these opponents of unity by simply pre-empting them, delivering Yemeni unification as an accomplished fact. The date on which the new Republic of Yemen was to be proclaimed and its constitution put into force was advanced six month from November to May 1990, and a 30-month transition period was added in order to allow time for the complete merger of state institutions as well as the reorganisation of political life [Burrows, 1992: 56].

The unified Republic was governed by a five-member Presidential Council (Article 79) headed by President Salih with al-Baydh as vice President. A 39-member Cabinet consisted of most of the current ministers of the two Yemens, and a 301-member Council of Representatives was made up of the 159 members of the YAR's (Presidentially -appointed- Advisory Council), the 111 members of the PDRY's Supreme People's Council (The Presidium) and 31 new appointees. For the duration of the interim period, the positions in government were to be allocated equally between the two parts of the ruling bodies.

The draft Constitution, was adopted by the legislatures of the two parts of Yemen on 21st May 1990, and on the following day President Salih proclaimed the birth of The Republic of Yemen from Aden. The military had been withdrawn from the old common borders, and units from one part of Yemen had taken up new positions in the other part.

Ministries and the high command of the armed forces were officially merged, and foreign missions were unified. The Central Banks gradually merged their functions during the course of 1990-1. The joint committee for a unified political organisation recommended a multiparty system [Nonneman: 70]. The acceptance of a multiparty system was not merely a matter of democratic values, but was rather a means to avoid imposing a uniform ideology and organisation on diverse political groups, which could only have alienated them. This multiparty activity was a strategy to integrate the many groups into the new state, without committing them to a single ideology or leading party [Kostiner, 1990: 711].

With the beginning of the unification, nearly forty political parties were identified, but the most important ones, in addition to the two governing ones, were the Yemeni Reform Rally (YRR, al-Islah) which represented a tribal-commercial-Islamic mix under the leadership of Shaykh Abdallah al-Ahmar, a chieftain of the Hashid tribal confederation; the Ba'ath party (Iraq line); the Nasserites; and al-Haq party (Zaydi Islamic school) [Ayubi: 430].

From the outset of the debate over unification, President Salih and his entourage seemed confident of having the dominant voice in the unified state, not only because of the Northern predominance in terms of population, but also because it was recognised that the position of the YSP in the South was not very strong. The newly liberated media attacked the regime in the South reflecting its failing popularity. At the same time, the collapse of the communist world increased the regime's sense of vulnerability. These events combined with a fear of potential challenges in the YSP itself, coupled with the undoubted enthusiasm of the population for unity, all helped drive al-Baydh and his colleagues towards an accelerated time frame and the unity formula [Nonneman: 70].

Two trends or approaches toward unification emerged, one view advocated more gradual unification, permitting both sides to become acquainted before the final steps of unification. This view proposed a federal regime which would leave considerable power with the existing state authorities. All this was disregarded in favour of a swift union. Thus, when unification was actually declared, only a small number of government bodies had merged or were at least functioning in any kind of co-operative fashion [Kostiner, 1996: 17].

Forty six laws were approved regarding unified procedures for customs, taxation, the issue of passports, banking and diplomatic representation, but in practice, banking, currency and other key functions remained separate. The army commands of the two states were amalgamated, but the units remained separate In similar fashion, such major national bodies as trade unions and the militias were only united at the top, while retaining their previous composition in the middle and lower levels of ranking [loc. cit.].

Rivalry of elites

The multi-party system became a framework for intense political struggle between the various elites; such as the leaders of the major political parties and the leaders of other major tribal, religious and social groups. According to Kostiner, two issues characterised the politics of the united Yemen Republic. The one involved the inter relationship between the elite groups, where the backbone of the unification was formed by the two leading parties the GCP and the YSP, with their inter relationship determining the effectiveness and stability of the new government of Yemen. The second was the substance of the discourse between the elites [Kostiner, 1996: 22].

From the beginning of union the GPC hoped to utilise the new RY system to eliminate the South as a political entity quickly⁵. In contrast, the YSP hoped to penetrate and mobilise the Northern society. A formula to merge the two parties was suggested. From the point of view of President Salih, the GPC is the largest political organisation, but in fact, it is not a political party in its structure and functions, it is rather an umbrella organisation encompassing a wide range of political tendencies. This political organisation was intended to serve President Salih as a mechanism for rubber stamping executive decisions. The GPC possesses neither coherent philosophy nor political programme, but is run through a vast network of patronage and the distribution of resources [Latta: 59-60]. For this reason, the YSP will be dissolved and absorbed by the GPC.

By contrast, there were two opposing factions in the YSP. One, the pragmatist wing, headed by Salim Salih Mohammed a member of the Presidential Council and Yasin Said Numan the Speaker of Parliament, urged closer co-operation with the GPC. They increasingly conformed to President Salih's view that only a unified GPC/YSP would create the political conditions needed for economic prosperity and the comprehensive unification of the political and administrative structure of the YAR and the PDRY. The second group, the hard-line wing, led by Jar Allah Omar and the Minister of Local Administration Mohammad Said Abdallah (known as Mohsen), argued for the party to distance itself from the GPC and align with the opposition. Al-Baydh, the Secretary General, tended towards the latter group until the elections of 1993 saw him switch to the pragmatists [Ibid. : 61-2].

In the context of such rivalry, each side started to cultivate its power in the area dominated by the other side. For this reason, the YSP continued to control affairs in the South and preserved the old PDRY military units, which had not been amalgamated with the northern army. The YSP with its relatively good qualities of administration, started an active programme designed to penetrate and cultivate centripetal forces allied to it among the deprived social strata of the North. The Bakil tribal confederation, which is the main tribal aggregation, but with fragmented leadership and which has been excluded from the ruling privileges in the North, was attracted to become involved in extensive negotiations with the YSP⁶. The lower Northern Yemen areas (Hujaryya) which represented the urbanised and intellectual strata in the YAR and which were historically deprived and sympathetic to the South, were widely penetrated by the YSP. A third stratum constituted women, who in the PDRY had enjoyed extensive legal rights based on a progressive family code, and good access to work and education⁷. The YSP gradually was able to mobilise most of the gender organisations in the YR.

Finally, the Gulf crisis led to the expulsion of nearly one million Yemeni workers from the Gulf, most of whom were in Saudi Arabia. The loss of workers remittances which resulted caused an estimated loss of $3 billion to the Yemeni economy without taking into consideration the private losses. Construction projects and tourism came to a virtual standstill in Yemen, as did Yemeni trade relations, leading to economic collapse and the rapid growth of inflation⁸. It was a serious problem for the poorer elements of the population. The YSP exploited the situation by standing against the pro-Iraqi position. It portrayed itself as the representative vanguard of the workers and the poorer classes.

However, despite all these active steps, the YSP remained fragmented and vulnerable. The party was overshadowed by the legacy of three decades of Stalinist rule. The disputes of 1967, 1970, 1978 and 1986 created a segmented organisation, each of whom were seeking revenge. This stripped a great deal of support from the YSP. This division was exploited by the GPC. This weakness in the position of the YSP was also exacerbated by its mistreatment of the ex-Southerners after unification, when the YSP failed to return lands and properties sequestrated in the years after independence. In addition, YSP officials in the countryside in the South continued an antagonistic attitude to the ex-Southerners mostly for traditional and historical reasons. This gave the GPC an advantage in attracting and maintaining their loyalty.

Unlike the elite of the South, the Northern elite was both better organised and enjoyed wide support. Despite the multi-party activity, the power structure of the Northern elite reflected the attempt of President Salih to continue ruling the RY in the same way he had ruled the YAR. He cultivated a network of officials from his extended family and close associates, who emanated from Sanhan and Hamdan tribal groups of the Hashid confederacy. Control by the ruling family was sustained by retaining the leadership and control over military and administrative institutions, and by allocating jobs within those institutions to activists of other, notably Hashid tribal groups. this turned them into clients and won their support. A broad network of Salih's clients based on patronage thus ran the Northern security forces, public administration, and dominated the main commercial sectors and key tribal groups. In this respect, Shaykh Abdallah al-Ahmar, the paramount Shaykh of the Hashid confederation, joined Zindani, an Islamic activist, in forming the Yemeni Reform Rally (YRR), which was also part of the Northern patronage network which extended into urban centres and associated with the GPC, from which it stemmed [Kostiner, 1996: 22-28]. In sum, the power base had three legs: military, tribal and commercial.

However, the seeming solidarity of the regime in the North concealed a deep fragmentation. The ruling structure which was based on a tribal-military-commercial complex to use the term coined by Paul Dresch, distanced the ruling elite from their constituencies. The power and wealth were concentrated in a few hands, some tribal, some not, and make up a coalition within the North between top ranking officers, mainly relatives of the President, powerful merchants and some tribal Shaykhs. This formula persisted after unity including some Southern figures [Dresch, 1995: 33-55].

Politics of survival

Salih treated the South according to the principles of northern politics, making inroads into southern groups through personal contacts, appointments and subventions [Ayubi: 434-7]. Soon it became evident that the larger northern population was unreceptive to overtures from the YSP for cultural and ethical reasons and that it tended to favour the GPC and the YRR.

Tension developed between the GPC and the YSP over government public works, which were run on a formula of 50-50 sharing. Every YSP minister was besieged by GPC officials in an attempt to deter him in his work and obstacles that could be publicly blamed were placed in his way. The Minister of Defence, a member of the YSP leadership, was subjected to an intense struggle over the control of the armed forces⁹. The GPC was able to halt the immediate unification of the armies, and the YSP was also excluded from the internal security network, which was controlled by the GPC officials. Furthermore, in the first few years of unification many YSP activists had been assassinated or had had attempts made on their lives. Most of these attacks were blamed on the Islamists of the YRR, which had become a junior ally of the GPC and which was politically and ideologically unhappy about the new partnership with the Socialists. The GPC was also able to build up clandestine groups inside the YSP among the upper middle ranking cadres.

The building of the state was a rather conflictual matter, with the YSP calling on the government to implement a national programme for reform, which it adopted in principle and to take responsibility for mistakes and negligence. These reforms would lead to comprehensive administrative and institutional changes, to reform security measures, education, the health system and price control. These improvements must of necessity be accompanied by strict moral behaviour at the top, and include a readiness on the part of officials to resign over past mistakes¹⁰. This programme was absolutely refused by the GPC and the YRR. In response, al-Baydh withdrew to Aden in September 1992 in order to express his disagreement. Later these demands became the basis of the YSP platform, the only way that the YSP had to drag the GPC down to its own level of weakness.

By comparing the two camps, it can be seen that an alliance had been formed among the GPC, the YRR and Hashid tribal confederation. The GPC functioned as the leader of this diverse camp, which embraced and shared economic and political interests, a common heritage, family and tribal loyalties and an involvement with the institutions [Ibid. :44]. This coalition was cemented and exploited by connections with the pre-unification administration, military and social bodies and by facing a common threat from the YSP. These ties were manipulated through the control that the GPC had over the unified state resources.

By contrast, the YSP emerged as a body that shared common values and concerns with the modernists of the left in the RY. The elite of the YSP, as viewed by Michael Hudson, tended towards a bureaucratic, institutionalised and formal, legal state order. Despite a certain degree of disagreement among its leaders.

Before the first representative elections, the public opinion, ironically, expressed in protest and demonstrations in both urban and tribal sectors, but reveals the inability of Yemeni society to establish a socio-political alternative to the governing elites. The protests were intrinsically non-institutionalised and failed to form broad and lasting inter tribal or urban-tribal coalitions [Ibid.: 43]. Therefore, the actual political scene was confined to the two leading parties and their allies and this was later identified as rivalry between the South and the North, despite the fact that neither was represented fully or legitimately by any single party.

In sum, the politics of survival predominated the Yemeni politics from the outset of unification, which marginalised policies of development. This created a frustration among people, who were hoping to improve their live standards with unity.

The elections of 1993 was the first major step towards implementing the new pluralist constitutionalist order. Ironically, it ended up by exacerbating the latent tension between the two former ruling parties. Despite the accumulation of disputed issues since the union in 1990, grievances were mitigated in the hopes of securing a triumphant victory through the ballot box. At the time each side had prepared contingency plans for an expected dispute, each was working to weaken the other.

The stability and continuity of the union experiment depended to a large extent on co-operation between the GPC and YSP. Therefore, President Salih raised the divisive issues indirectly through his ally the YRR. Since there was no clear distinction between the GPC and the YRR in either ideology or organisation¹¹, this was possible . For example, with reference to the referendum of May 1991 on the Constitution, which was approved by the majority¹², the YRR led an unsuccessful boycott purely because the Sharia (religious law) was described as "the main" instead of "the only" source of legislation¹³. This action was directed mainly against the YSP which was presented as atheistic. Another example lay in the conflict raised against The Institutes of Learning (religious schools belonging to the YRR) which were outside the state system of schooling¹⁴. These institutes threatened the YSP, since they were devoted to training fundamentalists.

In this context, the different parties turned to the society in pre-election preparation. Among the formal civic institutions were at least forty political parties, unions, syndicates, human rights groups and political action committees. Some of these parties and organisations were survivors from the YAR or the PDRY, while others were post-unification. Some civic initiatives were encouraged by the GPC and some by the YSP in order to counterbalance or abort organisations manipulated by the other [Carapico, 1996: 307].

A democratic atmosphere permeated the civil society¹⁵, prior to the elections and away of the government influence, with a series of mass conferences providing the means of expression and mobilisation for the articulated elements of the opposition. These conferences, held throughout the country, gathered thousands of diverse people: tribesmen, urban intellectuals, Journalists and professionals. They all issued demands for: civil and human rights; local elections; depoliticisation of and the merge of the armies; judicial independence; fiscal restraint and management; peaceful resolution of tribal disputes; and many other reforms¹⁶. These events were reported by over one hundred newspapers, both partisan and independent, which provided critical commentary and unbiased information about the opposition and the conferences of the non governmental organisations (NGOs).

The unexpected critical response from units of society and the NGOs forced both the GPC and the YSP to amend their strategies in order to decrease dependence on popular support to defeat the rival party. While the YSP sought support from external powers, the GPC adopted the Migdal's "physical model" in the struggle for survival. In fact, the GPC had adopted this model from the outset of union, but it culminated at this period. President Salih succeeded, through promises and rewards, to imposed fragmentation in the YSP. Also, actually within the YSP an allied forces for him, he focused on the military and security institutions of the YSP and penetrated them extensively, which was particularly damaging to the YSP during the civil war as will be seen later. The pragmatic wing of the YSP politburo was encouraged and eulogised by the President¹⁷.

The President's monopoly of state resources, even of the revenues from the southern oilfields, gave him a great capacity of manoeuvre and influence. He did this by bribing some of the political figures who were in parties sympathetic to him or some who were allied to the YSP for the purpose of dissent. The phenomena of fragmentation in some parties was apparent in the period that preceded the elections. For example, the Ba'ath (Iraq line) was divided into two streams, and the Nasserite party was divided into three factions¹⁸. It has been observed that this fragmentation occurred only in the leftist parties which were in agreement with the YSP in many aspects of the issue of state-building.

In addition, to working to fragment the left opposition, the huge advantages that the President had enabled him to create new power centres in the South. Active steps were taken, mainly with previous tribal and society personalities, to repatriate them and to restore their old social influence, which had been eradicated by the socialisation policies of the YSP after independence. The response these measures was largely positive. The economic deterioration of the post Gulf war added to the vulnerability of the YSP. These restored power centres were able to influence rural society in the South in favour of the GPC or the YRR under the slogans of traditional or Islamic values.

Any hindrance to the development of state policies or to the alleviation of poverty was blamed on the YSP. During the PDRY people were used to depending on the state to provide them with health care, education, security, amenities, pricing and so on. By contrast, people in the YAR, where the tribal structure was strong and the state was weak, did not expect nor demand that the state should provide such functions¹⁹. Therefore, economic recession had greater repercussions in the South.

The YRR took the initiative to help people in the South. It filled gaps in the social services: health care, emergency relief, post-secondary vocational training, religious education, needle work classes, summer camps and group marriage ceremonies for those who could not afford a traditional wedding were all provided²⁰. These projects of the YRR Social Welfare reached many thousands of lower income families, mainly those in the South. This convinced people that they should give their allegiances to the YRR in particular and the GPC in general, which served to worsen the position of the YSP in the South and increased its vulnerability. The resources available for use were viewed as a pure YRR initiative funded by its own budget in order to marginalise the role of the YSP, although in reality they were partially funded by the state

By comparison, the North can not be portrayed as a single solid unit. It also was fragmented, indeed even more than the South, but there were limits for fragmentation and disagreements were dominated by rooted and prevalent social ethics. The vast majority of the Yemenis were organised tribally, so on the one hand they were sympathetic to the YSP's programme for development, and its aim to lessen the dominance of the GPC. On the other hand, they wanted restraints so that the YSP would be confined within certain limits, because they were fearful of its history and its known antipathy towards the tribal system. These fears were played upon by the GPC in the pre-election period.

Election results

Despite the institutional character of the parties, the majority of candidates presented themselves as independents. Out of 3,181 candidates who presented themselves on election day (including 24 women), 1,968 were independents 62% while 1,213 (including 17 women) 38% were party candidates. This may be explained in two ways. Firstly, the multi-party system was a new departure and to some extent party activity was ignored in the countryside, where the rate of illiterate voters was (70-80%)²¹. Many candidates, therefore, preferred to present themselves as independents. Secondly, there was a hidden game played by the leading parties against each other to turn around the agreement between them, where they had agreed on gerrymandering.

Out of 301 seats, only two were won by women: one for the YSP and the other an independent. Both were from the South²². The independents won 48 seats, and the rest were won by 8 different parties, distributed as follows: GPC-123, YRR-62, YSP-56, Ba'ath (Iraq line)-2, al-Haqq-2, and there were 3 won by three different Nasserite factions²³.

Despite some instances of disorder and violence, and scores of complaints²⁴, the outcome indicated a genuine contest [Carapico, 1993: 3]. The results of the elections on April 1993, however, did not replicate the power-sharing formula. The GPC took the lion's share of the votes, while the YSP not only found itself a very junior partner, but also discovered a new rival, the YRR.

Despite their rivalry, the leading parties were acutely aware of the necessity of implementing pre-existing governmental arrangements post election in order to avoid a political vacuum. Abdallah al-Ahmar, leader of the YRR was elected the chairmanship of the Council Of Representatives (COR). One of the YSP leaders, Attas as Prime Minister, appointed a new government consisting of 15 ministers from the GPC, 8 from the YSP, 6 from the YRR and 1 from the Ba'ath.

The countdown for containing and stripping the YSP of its power had begun. After the elections were over, the political struggle centred on two main issues; Constitutional reform and power sharing.

The leaders of the YSP entered unity in the belief that they would remain at least an equal partner with the GPC regime in Sana'a. They had an agenda for development that they hoped would overcome the traditional structure of tribalism, corruption and backwardness that had characterised northern politics. Yet, they feared falling under the domination of a northern political way of life for which they had no respect. Therefore, when they lost the elections, the YSP leaders had to rethink their attitude towards the key issues of unity.

During the summer of 1993 after the elections, demonstrations and strikes by workers and students in Aden and al-Mukalla escalated, following price rises and food shortages in the South. The YSP sought to preserve its influence, so it opposed any expansion of President Salih's personal power. The YSP, therefore, advocated a new presidential format, in which the entire electorate participated in direct elections, on a single ticket for the offices of President and Vice-president, thereby providing a chance for YSP candidates to fill the posts. The GPC, however, objected to this constitutional amendment²⁵.

In October, al-Baydh took another tactical step to maintain a power base by presenting the government with an aggressive eighteen-point letter of demands. Al-Baydh's letter was comprehensive and pointed, explicitly outlining the differences between the perceptions of state-building as seen by the YSP and that followed by the northern parties. The letter stated that it wanted the following: a Consultative Council with equal representation for the RY's eighteen governates; a new presidential format; the reorganisation of the police and armed forces on a national basis; recognition for personal qualifications and merits; the reorganisation of the provincial governates to eliminate their pre-unification divisions and prepare for local elections; limits to the government's interference in implementing laws and ordinance pertaining to society; and to develop plans for the economy that would pay more attention to the free trade area of Aden [Kostiner, 1996 : 62]. In brief, the YSP wanted a state that would eliminate the power structure of the GPC and the YRR. Such claims might have seemed reasonable had they featured within the negotiations for unity prior to 1990, but now with the poor electoral showing of the YSP in 1993, they seemed rather a policy of ultimatum than an inspired doctrine.

Another aspect of the power struggle that worried the YSP was the inclusion of the YRR in the government, for power now had to be shared among three rather than two. Since the GPC and the YRR had common interests, this was seen by the YSP as diminishing their own power. It was thus vital to strengthen the YSP, and to this end its leaders concentrated their struggle on the military and the security forces. The YSP tried spread its authority over the entire Yemeni armed forces, which were under the jurisdiction of a YSP Minister of Defence. Through its government officials, the Minister of the Interior and the Chief of Command of the security forces, the GPC reacted and tried to abort the efforts of the YSP by creating bureaucratic and technical obstacles. The YSP then turned to cultivating underground YSP militias in the South where GPC authority was limited²⁶.

Another aspect of the struggle centred around uncontrolled terrorism. According to al-Baydh, over one hundred and fifty members of the YSP had been assassinated by late 1993 [Nonneman: 79].The YSP accused the YRR of supporting these fundamentalists.

The issue of constitutional changes itself, represented another aspect of the power struggle between the YSP on the one hand and the GPC and the YRR on the other. The YSP, for example, sought to expand its power base by proposing elections in the provincial governates. The YRR sought to build its power through arguing for the Shari'a as the sole source of legislation. The GPC aspired to the same goal by suggesting of the power of the President through the abolition of the Presidential Council [Kostiner, 1996: 64].

A deep conflict emerged which reflected the failure to create a joint platform for co-operation due to the gap between their differing perceptions of the course of future development for Yemen and the declining balance of power between them. The only solid ground that the YSP had to support its position against its rivals was its control over the army in the South. As time went by, a naked struggle erupted for governmental, economic and military power.

As the crisis deepened, in January 1994, concerned Yemenis from across the political spectrum met together in a National Dialogue Committee to try to work out a formula agreeable to the power centres in both Sana'a and Aden. The membership of the Dialogue Committee included', in addition to key officials from the GPC, YSP and YRR, many figures from smaller parties which grouped together in the Union of National Forces and the National Opposition Bloc. In addition, there were representatives of civil societies, including the Organisation for the Defence of Rights and Freedoms, the Federation of Women, the Federation of Doctors, Journalists, Writers, as well as professors from Sana'a and Aden Universities²⁷.

After months of deliberations, the committee drew up the Document of Pledge and Accord, which spelt out comprehensive reforms. The document had a positive reception from the majority of the public and intellectuals, and it was even accepted and signed by the two leaders of the GPC and the YSP in Jordan in February 1994. Yet, the lack of trust and antagonism between the President and the Vice-president was not diminished. Al-Baydh returned to Aden from the signing instead of Sana'a, insisting that he wanted to see action on the agreed points.

In fact, the Document of Pledge and Accord was contradictory. The YSP aims (and many of the main concerns of the YSP were reflected in the Document) for putting the GPC in critical position in order to prepare for and justify the secession. Although, the GPC had agreed with the document at the time, it was unwilling and unable to implement its points, having agreed to withdraw from the play the card that the YSP had so long played, and to gain enough time to prepare for the battle. The Document of Pledge and Accord, in fact, was too idealistic in relation to the conditions of Yemen, and as a political scientist at Sana'a University noted such an ambitious plan would have been very difficult to implement even if there had been perfect harmony between the main leaders²⁸. The logic of the situation, from the perspectives of either the GPC or the YSP led to a "zero-sum", for any gain for the YSP was a loss for the GPC and vice versa [Hudson, 1995: 16].

The disputed issues between rivals were like two parallel lines which can never meet, which in fact, centred around those who assumed power, for the power-sharing formula did not work. This was exacerbated by the fact that, from the beginning, the different factions did not trust each other. Both sides sought to achieve their aims by encapsulating them in justifiable and legitimate demands. The YSP wanted a decentralised state, which would grant considerable powers to its regional components, and give the vice-president greater autonomy and wider executive duties. They also wanted to disband the elite Republican Guards of the North and to merge of the two armies under the Minister of Defence, a YSP member. Also, the YSP demanded was the reorganisation of the security forces, the constrain and control of the state budget and resources, and the implementation of detribalisation policies. It is logical that the GPC should object to all these demands. Its superiority, in alliance with the YRR, was based on a majority in the legitimately elected parliament. It was clear that the demands of the YSP would strip the GPC of the vital pillars that had enabled President Salih to survive since 1978.

War seemed inevitable, and the signing of the Document of Pledge and Accord was recognised by both sides as only a temporary truce. The YSP believed that if war broke out, it would be restricted to skirmishes on the former international borders and a ceasefire would soon be brokered by both regional and international mediators. This would be to their advantage, and recreate the South as a separate entity. The YSP seemed confident that the GPC would be crippled by internal unrest, mainly from the Bakil tribal confederation. Meanwhile, the GPC and the YRR were strengthening their military positions and, surprisingly, they had been able to mobilised society successfully. The expected large-scale fighting broke out in early May 1994, and after two month the GPC and its allies had swept through the South and destroyed the military and security capabilities of the YSP.

Factors that Led to the Dominance of the GPC

Miscalculations characterised the domestic and foreign policies of the YSP. After the YSP lost the election, they put all their cards in the hands of the Saudis, hoping for their support against Salih's regime, which was at the time in a relationships of turmoil with Saudi Arabia. YSP quite forgot that Salih and Shaykh al-Ahmar are the actual, old Saudi allies. The time-honoured Saudi policy towards Yemen is to keep it under control by any means, so Saudis were quite willing to back any side willing to ignite the war. Many Saudis hoped this would re-divide Yemen not only just to pre- unification status, but even further into a number of mini-states. Saudi Arabia backed the formation of the YRR, which was the party most antagonistic to the YSP, with the aim of exhausting both Islamists and Socialists, which disfavour them for strategic security reasons. The Saudis since abdication of Yemeni monarchy, have financed the strengthening of the tribal structure at the expense of the central and modernised state that the YSP decreed. Also, the YSP was still thinking according to the Cold War principle, divide and rule: they envisioned that the secession. would have the blessing of the USA. Again they miscalculated, for the USA preferred a stable Yemen as part of the re-arrangement of the Middle East post Cold War. The USA played a crucial role in the termination of the attempt by the GCC led by Saudi Arabia to recognise the new secessionist state the Democratic Republic of Yemen, which was declared on 20th May 1994.

At the domestic level, the YSP made vital mistakes. The first, was at the beginning of the union project, under pressure of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, intra-party disputes and fears of a military coup, the YSP leadership rushed into unity that under-estimated the power of the North. No sufficient arrangements for sustained unity and integration of the institutions were made which deteriorated rapidly.

The second, was that the YSP stuck to its radical ideology and refused to change either its radical policies or its name. They ignored the fact that of the fourteen million added to the population after unification, most were illiterate, conservative and of tribal origin. The YSP's anti-Islamic political platform and its announced de-triblisation policy deprived it of the support of the majority, where, with a slight modification of its ideology it could have increased its appeal.

The third mistake was, that the YSP ignored, for ideological and personal reasons, the ex-southerners. These exiles had among them military units, administrative cadres, merchants, religious leaders and influential key figures. These people may have been willing to negotiate new relationships with the YSP and to have "come home" politically to the YSP as a "southern" party. The chauvinistic point of view of the YSP however drove them towards the GPC and YRR. These ex-Southerners played a crucial role in the defeat of the YSP in the war of 1994.

The fourth mistake was the concentration of the YSP on urban areas in a country which was dominated by an illiterate countryside. Tribal structure represented about 90% of the population. The YSP ignored the fact that the forces of violence and wealth were dominated by people of rural extraction. To a large extent, the countryside, was mobilised by the rivals of the YSP, who shared values and life style with the rural people.

The fifth mistake, was that the YSP put their faith in an uprising by the Bakil tribal confederation, as a competitor to the Hashid tribal confederation which belonged the political elite of the North. At the start of unification, each state deployed military units inside the other state. All the YSP military units were deployed in areas dominated by Bakil tribes. The YSP expected to be supported by them should conflict with Salih arise. However, for ethical reasons, and to maintain the balance (see above), the Bakil leadership refrained from political activities and from taking sides, remaining neutral during the fighting [Kostiner, 1996: 87]. This enabled the President's troops to surround or destroy these Socialist military units easily.

The sixth mistake was allowing intra-party fragmentation to arise at the critical time of the onset of the war. With the declaration of an independent Southern state, the unionist wing of the YSP distanced itself from the al-Baydh leadership and denied his decision. This encouraged many non-members and political parties, sympathetic to the YSP to back President Salih. A schism within the YSP occurred, when the new separate government allied itself with conservative and tribal Saudi-based southern elements. This act weakened the YSP by deepening the fragmentation and disagreement inside the party. As well as, damaging the party's credibility. Finally, the endless internal debate of the YSP constrained decision-making, making the leadership appears weak and hesitant, which gave President Salih a strategic advantage. Salih was able to impose intermittent truces, which he exploited to refuel his troops and to mobilised forces against the secessionists.

By comparison, the GPC led by President Salih and his allies implemented a fruitful plan, which started at the outset of unification, to eliminate the YSP. At the same time they also sought to strengthen the coalition of military, tribal and commercial complex. This patient, step by step plan, was based on destroying the YSP from within, strengthening the coalition and mobilising resources and people. The President played the politics of survival skilfully. Firstly, he kept his military and security organisations out of the control of YSP, and penetrated the political, military and security institutions of the YSP. Through Presidential monopoly of state revenues and distribution function, and through the appointment and rewards of some of the senior figures of the YSP, he was able to gain their flexibility on many issues opposite to the point of view of their leadership. This helped to create fragmentation within the YSP as each faction or wing became suspicious that the other might be allies of the President. Also the YSP's strategic plans were clandestinely revealed to its rivals.

Secondly, many YSP senior officials and activists were assassinated in dirty tricks by the President's security apparatus or his allies. Thirdly, the YSP ministers and officials in the government shared with the GPC and headed by a prime minister from the YSP, were overwhelmed by the GPC members in the same organisation, for they aborted their policies, and consequently, the YSP was blamed for the failure by the public. Fourthly, the GPC had a great capacity for the mobilisation of people by rewards and sanctions, through its access to the state revenues. This was cemented by its alliance with the YRR with its Islamic cliché and tribal connections that left the YSP lagging behind. Fifthly, through non-merit appointments and rewards, the President succeeded in fragmenting and weakening the political parties which were sympathetic to the YSP. Several dissents took place in the left-orientated parties, which affected their constituents and deflected attention to internal problems, thus weakening their support for the YSP.

Sixthly, the GPC took advantage of the mistakes of the YSP, and with a wide co-optation process they included most of the ex-Southern elements, in their ranks including 10 thousands soldiers who formed the military vanguard which conquered the South during the 1994 war. Seventhly, great attention was paid to the power centres of the South, which were supported by the GPC and incorporated into its organisation. These power centres played an important role in the disintegration of the southern front, both politically and militarily, for the YSP was assuming this front as its real backbone. From the very beginning of unification, political mobilisation had taken place against the YSP in the South, led by the Southern power centres which were allied to the GPC. At the same time, the YRR with its Islamic platform had mobilised the ancient religious centres in the South, which were revive after unification at the expense of the YSP. During the war of 1994, many southern areas announced their allegiance to the GPC and were ceded peacefully.

Eighthly, in extensive an extensive programme of propaganda put out by the GPC and YRR, the YSP was accused of being anti-Islam and they called on all Yemenis to be loyal to the mother country against a party that had begun to mortgage its policies to foreign interest²⁹. The declaration of the new Southern state gave the President the motivation, justification and encouragement to renew the war campaign and also gave him a real legitimacy as the genuine defender of the union³⁰.

Ninthly, various military advantages were achieved by the President forces. They neutralised the Southern units deployed in the North, while retaining their forces already deployed near the southern cities. In addition, the high command planned, supervised the long logistic lines and the intelligence of the President's troops were much better than that of the YSP ones³¹.

Finally, the cohesion and organisation of the President campaign was far superior at all levels to that of the YSP.

The new Democratic Republic of Yemen was officially recognised by no country other than Somalia, which soon collapsed after sweeping victories by the Unionist forces. Yemen was reunified under the coalition of military-tribal-commercial complex. This coalition itself contained contradictions, which required later remodelling and a triangle of accommodation to make it work.

Copyright © Ahmed Abdel-Karim Saif 1998