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AFTER THE WAR, President Salih moved quickly to relieve frustration in the South. He was aware that with the integration of the country, when all Yemenis needed commendation, the faithful from the South needed particular attention. He promised reconstruction and reconciliation to follow his pledge of an amnesty for all the participants in the war, with the exception of the sixteen DRY leaders, who were put on trial. The President kept channels open for dialogue with the leaders of the YSP, who were included in the amnesty decree. He also promised to compensate the Southern population and normalise public life in the South, while continuing the process of democratisation and activating the development process [Kostiner, 1996: 102]. The President also, gave urgent orders to remove any impact of the war from Aden by rebuilding, reconstituting the social services and ordering the withdrawal of all military units from Aden, leaving only the Central Security Forces and the police force to regulate daily life.

The institutional changes

By defeating the YSP in the war and destroying its institutions all obstacles to re-modelling the state according to the interests of the winners, had been removed. The power-sharing formula was still in existence, but now the agreement was between the GPC as senior partner and its wartime ally, the YRR, as a junior partner. Although, they had much in common and there was relative harmony between the two partners, nevertheless, the President was worried about the increasing power of the Islamic wing of the YRR. However, they co-operated during this period to re-organise the political scene and to implement constitutional and institutional changes, thus consolidating.

There were attempts to destroy the YSP. Soon after, however, a decree issued by the Constitutional Supreme Court called for the confiscation of all property, equipment and liquid assets that belonged to the YSP. The YRR called for the dissolution and disbandement of the YSP under accusation of high treason for igniting the war and for threatening the unity. The President vetoed this demand and instead called on the YSP to elect a new leadership and open a dialogue to prepare for rehabilitation. The President's fear of the Islamists led him to retain the YSP as a counterbalance¹. Having lost its two wings, the military and security capacities, there would be no more threats arising from the YSP, which was now under control. The YSP elected a new leadership, which condemned the war and the secession, and entered in a long hard dialogue with the GPC.

At the same time, merging processes were stepped up in order to incorporate southern institutions. The most important of these was the merging of the armies², with the Southern army being distributed into different branches of the state's army, so that there should not be any aggregation of officers or soldiers belonging to the same tribe or province. Those holding high ranks in the southern army were retired or dismissed. Also, the security apparatus of the YSP was dissolved and was not incorporated into state security system.

A special government meeting held in Aden on July 12th 1994 was devoted to the reorganisation of the army. It decided that in future the army should be free from any political influence. It also agreed on the absolute illegality of private armies and unofficial militia³. Though appearing to be aimed at the YSP role in the uprising, in reality it reflected Salih's preparations for future problems. This decision aimed to put Islamic paramilitary activities, which were run by the fundamentalist wing of the YRR under the law of violence. An announced first step was to close their training camps. Meanwhile, the army remained influenced by the GPC through the Political and Moral Direction Department, which had branches in all army divisions headed by intelligence agents affiliated to the GPC. In addition, the high ranking officers and the Minister of Defence were members in the GPC.

Integration of the key sectors and power centres continued. The Central Bank in Aden was closed and its functions were transferred to the Central Bank in Sana'a. Moreover, it was announced that the Yemeni Dinar (PDRY currency) had been cancelled, and a limited period of time was allowed for holders of this currency to replace it with the unified Yemeni currency, the Riyal, at the banks. In addition, the PDRY airlines (al-Yamda) was merged with the Yemeni airlines (al-Yemenia). Many employees lost their posts, either through retirement or dismissal⁴.

YSP cadres who occupied positions in the state organisations were replaced by members of the GPC. Many of these new appointees were followers of the former southern President Ali Nasser Mohammad, who had been ousted in 1986. They had been incorporated into the GPC since they were defeated in 1986 and they played an important role in the fragmentation of the YSP during the interim period. Again this control tactic had both an inclusive and a defensive role. These ex-Southerners received Salih's gratitude and came to own him their positions. In addition, President Salih was unwilling to establish an Islamic republic based on Sharia'a and was therefore interested in involving these southern in government to counterbalance the YRR⁵.

After the war, in a pre-emptive action, to control a burgeoning new power centre, President Salih abolished the Presidential Council, which was running the country as the ultimate executive authority, according to the unity agreement⁶. There were two reasons behind this decision: one was to allow the President more political independence and thus to concentrate control into his hands. Secondly, it was to remove al-Zindani, the general guide of the YRR and the actual leader of the Islamists, from the position of influence that he enjoyed as a member of the council. The COR ratified the abolition of the council on 22 September 1994⁷.

To mitigate the loss of Zindani, as a trade off. The GPC did not obstruct a new parliamentary ratification of the Constitution, which declared that the Sharia'a (Islamic law) should be the sole source of legislation in Yemen⁸. The President thus avoided a direct confrontation with the Islamists. He also has tried other forms of political accommodation. A key safety valve of the accommodation process is Shaykh al-Ahmar, the speaker of the COR and the leader of the YRR. Although, he is not an Islamist, he founded the YRR out of a coalition of tribes and Islamic currents. Al-Ahmar plays a key broker role between Salih and the Islamists. The Islamists needed al-Ahmar as protection and in order to get access to power through him. Obversely, al-Ahmar could keep them under control to prevent them from threatening his mutual interests with the President and to use them, when necessary, for either domestic or foreign policy pressure on Salih. However, given the majority the GPC and the YRR command in the COR, they impose many institutional changes, although, they did not always agree on all issues.

The President passed a project for a new administrative re-division of the eighteen governates of the RY to the COR. The government justified this change as eliminating the old border lines between the two Yemens by merging parts of the governates on the border, to form new ones. The aim also was to divide the larger governates such as Hadhramowt (in the south) into two or more smaller ones to facilitate the implementation of development plans and to ease and accelerate the people's dealings with the government.

This project has caused controversy, for the opposition suggested that it must be linked with the decentralisation of local authority, in which the people elect their own governor, governate council and chief of local police. The opposition based their argument on the Document of the Pledge and Accord (DPA), which called for combined legal and administrative reforms. The GPC objected and the President declared that the DPA was cancelled. Strikes and demonstrations ensued, mainly in Aden and al-Mukalla calling for local authority, but the President then brought his influence to bear on the YRR to bloc the push for local authority in the COR. Subsequently, the government withdrew its demands for administrative division⁹. Notwithstanding this defeat, the GPC has paid great attention to administrative division, which would improve their control over the country. The Minister of Legal Affairs (GPC) has indicated, that this decision will be among the foremost tasks of the new government after the elections of 1997¹⁰.

The President also worked to the contain key social figures through the establishment of the Consultative Council (CC). The appointees included; merchants, tribal leaders, politicians, intellectuals and religious leaders¹¹. The CC offered a prestigious alternative as compensation to these power brokers, who may have suffered loss in the elections of 1997. It also established new links to those, who were free of any linkage of interest with the regime. In addition, the CC appeared as a vehicle for the expansion for political participation. The CC's role however, was restricted to consulting with the head of state, which is quite different from the situation envisaged in the DPA, where it was asserted that binding decisions could be made by the elected CC, whose functions were complementary to those of the COR.

Another key institutional change, was in the Military Economic Establishment (MEE). This organisation was founded by former President al-Hamdi in mid-1970s. Its main goal was to involve the military forces in development processes through construction and joint production. During the rule of President Salih, its functions had been shifted. The MEE dominated state export-import activities, with exemption from taxes and had its own undeclared budget. The MEE became one of the main sources of revenue for the President, which in turn gave him greater influence. After unification it was renamed the Yemeni Economic Establishment and its activities decreased under pressure from the YSP. However, after the defeat of the YSP in 1994, its previous status was restored and it expanded its activities to include the South. The way it linked the military and economic elites deepened.

Finally, the regime encouraged and supported dissension among the opposition. A compliant National Council for Opposition has been created, consisting of seven political parties which had dissented from their mother parties. These were given a legal license, declaring them as new and independent parties¹². The regime's goal was to substitute and topple the genuine Supreme Co-ordinating Council for Opposition. An organisation set up, this tame opposition called for making concessions to the government, taking into consideration the critical circumstances of the Yemen. The regime also used it to improve its democratic image abroad thus helping Yemen acquire grants and loans.

The new control framework

While still beset with a vast array of domestic and foreign problems, President Salih announced a reduction of some 50,000 men in the country's armed forces¹³. There were a number of announced reasons for this supposed decrease in power. In particular, Salih argued that these cuts were made in line with austerity measures recommended by the international lending institutions. Such claims are hard to credit as the cuts were far from comprehensive; they were in fact restricted to recruits of the YSP, those who had not shown themselves strongly loyal to the GPC and those who deserved to retire on a pension. It has been observed, that dismissal was confined mainly to the southerners¹⁴ in a comprehensive process of purging. In fact, these changes strengthened Salih's control and tightened Yemen's defensive position. Great attention was paid to the purchase of increasingly sophisticated military hardware and to the modernising of the military forces¹⁵, particularly the elite Republican Guards. Clearly, the President was not reducing his military might, he was rather streamlining it.

Similarly, the Political Security Office (PSO) has played a very important role in strengthening the position of the President. The PSO is heading by a key figure in the GPC, who is a very close to the President. The PSO expanded its activities all over the country, penetrating different political organisations, military units, government bodies and even the NGOs. The PSO working to achieve two goals. The first, was to detect and remove any centrifugal forces that might threaten the regime. The PSO employed a number of tactics to undermine other power centres. In particular, they created dissension in rival political parties¹⁶, and perpetrating dirty tricks such as assassinations, kidnapping, torture or espionage. Active NGOs were particular targets, where they had penetrated and established allied civil bodies¹⁷. A second goal of the PSO was to consolidate all centripetal forces, that supported the regime vis-à-vis its rivals, for example, they formed the National Council for Opposition (see above), supported the new southern power centres (see above) and co-opted some sympathetic Islamists in the GPC.

The GPC has a well established frame of control which they inherited from the pre-unification era. This is based on tribal- military-commercial complex¹⁸. Therefore, post-war attention was paid to the expansion of the structure of control in the South and to the merging of it with that in the North into a single network. It is widely believed, that the regime has instigated tribal conflicts and encouraged arbitration under tribal law, rather than civil or Islamic law, where the punishments under the tribal law depleted a tribe's resources¹⁹. This gave the regime a double advantage. First, it deflected tribal's power away from the opposition to the regime. In addition, the tribes weakened each other rendering their leaders dependent on the state for either support or mediation. Secondly, it gave the regime leverage over the tribes for the creation of a new tribal leadership. These new leaders were intermediaries, who controlled society on behalf of the regime, and were incorporated into the state controlled interest-complex. In addition, all the governors of the southern governates were nominated from among GPC members in order to consolidate the control and to eradicate any residue of the influence of the YSP.

The President showed concern for growing power of the fundamentalist wing of the YRR. He used them to balance off the YSP during the interim period and mobilised their forces against the YSP during the war. But, since 1994 they have became dangerous and the President has dealt with them in a number of ways. Firstly, some of their moderate leaders have been co-opted to the GPC and given nonmerit appointments in the government. Secondly, a law was issued that prohibited the formation of any militia, in order to dissolve the Islamic militias (see above). Thirdly, the Learning Institutions, those institutions belonged to the YRR, which used for teaching political Islamic ideology and for military training, have been targeted for merger into the educational system (an old YSP demand). The Learning Institutions are a major power base for YRR consisting of 300,000 students, they have an independent budget of 5 billion Yemeni Riyal²⁰. Meantime, the YSP were permitted to retain confiscated properties and frozen credits²¹, in order that a controlled YSP should counterbalance and so diminish the Islamic activities.

Finally, efforts were made to reconcile and normalise relationships with Saudi Arabia. This could increase the President's power, for Saudi Arabia would give up supporting his rivals and would relieve economic sanctions by rehabilitating Yemeni workers and giving financial aid. Towards this end, a memorandum of understanding was signed between Yemen and Saudi Arabia in 1995, which resulted in the formation of different mutual committees to solve disputed issues. Positive signals were released that they are almost ready to announce an agreement that would cover the demarcated borders, workers, trade, security and so forth²².

The elections of 1997

The Yemeni electorate was called upon to elect the new COR on April 27th, 1997. About 4.6 millions voters, a turnout of about 80 percent of eligible voters, went to 2070 polling stations²³. Of the candidates 754 were partisan and 1557 were independents with 20 women among them²⁴. Yemenis turned out in huge numbers to choose the new 301 seat parliament in what has been described as a largely fair elections²⁵. The main opposition (the YSP, the Yemeni Unionist Aggregation, the Union of Popular Forces and the Sons of Yemen League) boycotted the polls, citing alleged irregularities.

Among 15 eligible parties competed for the COR, the Supreme Elections Committee announced that the GPC won 189 seats, the YRR 53 seats, the Nasserite Unionist 3, the Ba'ath 2 and the independents 54 seats. The GPC parliamentary bloc should include another 39 legislator who ran as independents. The YRR bloc was also reportedly joined by 10 independents²⁶.

The YRR had grievances about the conduct of the vote, but nevertheless refrained from challenging the whole electoral exercise, preferring to remain engaged in the political game. The election was marred by the deaths of 11 people, but this was considered a reasonable toll in a country that was so largely tribal and where there are three times as many guns as people.

The comfortable majority won by the GPC, along with the defeat of most of the prominent figures affiliated to the YRR hard-line, enabled the President to end the coalition with the YRR. The Saudis appeared relieved that fundamentalists received a drubbing at the polls, and were likewise delighted that the tribal element in the YRR, headed by Shaykh al-Ahmar who has close ties with the Saudis²⁷, did so well. President Salih said that achieving a parliamentary majority would make it easier to approve a border deal with Saudi Arabia²⁸. Rapprochement with Saudi Arabia is at the top of the President's list of priorities, because of its security and economic repercussions.

So, despite the GPC majority in the COR, the GPCs MPs elected Shaykh al-Ahmar to the chairmanship of the COR. This shows that there was no intention in Yemen to eliminate Saudi influence, and that there was the intention to preserve the old-new coalition of the tribal-military-commercial complex, for which al-Ahmar was one of the pillars.

An independent southern personality Faraj Ben-Ghanim, an economist and professional technocrat, was commissioned to form the new government. This revealed that there was no discrimination towards southerners and sent a clear signal to the Yemeni street, the Saudis and international lenders that Yemen focusing seriously on the economy²⁹.

In addition, the President said that they would only accept a new formula whereby there would be participant rather than partners in the government, meaning that he wants to shoulder the responsibility, with participants in government doing so on a personal basis and with the intention of implementing the GPC's policies³⁰.

The government headed by Ben-Ghanim as a prime minister contained 28 portfolios. Apart from four, the rest were affiliated to the GPC. The major portfolios which remained in the same hands were Interior, Planning, Development, Information and Industry. Defence went to a new minister. The appointment of the Secretary General of al-Haq, another Islamic party, as Minister of Awqaf (religious endowments) did not bode well for the YRR, which had held this portfolio in the previous cabinet. This indicates that the government intend to strike at the fundamentalists and take control of the mosques, most of whose preachers are considered supporters of YRR. The al-Haq party is a supporter of the Zaidi tendency [an offshoot of the Shiite Muslim sect] while YRR fundamentalists are Sunnite Muslim³¹.

The Yemeni political parties

One ancient Yemeni poet says: "The unluckiest man in the world is who rides the lion or rules Yemen".

This shows how much Yemeni politics is complex. Many lines become crossed and contradictions coexist, where ideology goes hand in hand with patronage and nepotism with discipline.

The multiparty system in the Yemen was a new experiment implemented with the unity not a choice, but out of a necessity for compromise before unity. In the North, the erstwhile regime was closed to parties, their activities were depicted as treason or allied with foreign interests. The former regime in the South, on the other hand, was adapted to a single-party system. At the outset of unification as the system was opened, political parties proliferated reaching a total of around 46. Some of these had already existed and worked underground, but the majority were new.

By August 1997, however, only 15 parties continue to existence; the rest have disappeared. The most important are: the GPC, YSP, YRR, the Ba'ath (2 lines), the Nasserite factions (7 lines), al-Haqq, the Sons of Yemen League, the Union of Popular Forces and the Yemeni Unionist Aggregation.

There are two aspects of Yemeni political parties that should be highlighted. The first, is internal, consisting of social, economic and political features. Parties resemble their context since Yemeni society is weak and fragmented, with about 70 percent illiteracy. This is reflected on the political consciousness, where personality is more important than the party programme. Also, a weakness of the production base means there is a lack of funds to enable parties to carry out their original functions. Society has definite social strata, which pushes parties toward a populism discourse and ambiguous programmes. Parties look for financing either from the government or from abroad, both of which expand the gap between leadership and constituency. In addition, there is the phenomenon that the popularity of some parties is based on personality, family or tribe. Personal connections and patronage assume greater importance than the programmes and policies. Lacking of intra-party democracy leads to the party being treated as if it is a private asset. The party activities and the political agenda, if at all, are centred around the personality of the leader. This explains one aspect of the frequent cycle of violence in the Yemeni political scene.

The second point is, that all Yemeni political debate is based on imported ideologies. For instance, the Nationalist discourse is borrowed from Nasser or the Ba'ath, the international socialist is borrowed from Marx, Lenin or Mao, and the religious discourse is an extension of Wahhabism, Iran, al-Turabi or the Muslim Brethren. Enrichment of political discourse is desirable, but a discourse that is based on, and reflects the Yemeni peculiarity and dealing with the Yemeni problems in a rational way is still absent, and the solutions that are submitted are irrelevant³². This means it difficult to mobilise the masses.

The economic situation

Four key economic variables impinge on Yemen's future: the development of the hydrocarbons sector and the revenues obtained from it; the fate of the returnees, mainly the former workers in Saudi Arabia; the level of international aid; and the success of the programme to restructure and the subsequent efforts to attract domestic and expatriate investment [Nonneman: 86]. The way these develop depends to differing degrees on the political stability of the government. Given the acute financial difficulties and the high level of unemployment in the Yemen, these are urgent problems.

Yemen's economy is in a state of acute crisis, characterised by a chronic deficit in the balance of payments, a continuing deficit in government spending, and a mounting foreign debt. The projected deficit for the country's current account for 1995 was $1.1 billion, rising to $1.5 billion in 1996. The government's budget deficit has been running consistently at between 20 and 30 per cent of the GDP in recent years. No budgets were issued in 1993 and 1994, but the deficit in these two years has been estimated at some 30 billion YR and 50 billion YR respectively [Ibid. : 87]. When the 1995 budget looked as if it was spiralling still further out of control, the government promised to reduce the deficit from 60 billion to 37 billion YR, a promise that it was unable to keep³³. The average exchange rate of the YR against the US dollar was 29 (1992), 54 (1993), 130 (1994), and 125 (1995): this in itself is an indication of the difficulties the economy is suffering.

By the end of 1995 the official foreign debt was estimated at close to $10 billion. This includes a debt of $3-4 billion owed to the former Eastern bloc. At current exchange rates, it will be hard to repay this debt. There is however, no agreement over whether the Eastern bloc debt will be repaid and, if it is, how this will be done [loc. cit.].

The flow of aid depends in large measures on good foreign relations, especially with Saudi Arabia. There has already been some modest success achieved in this respect. Although, Yemen still receives some foreign aid, it is, however, unlikely ever to receive aid at the levels that prevailed in the 1980s.

There is an urgent need to regain a higher level of expatriate employment, both for the relief of the financial deficit and because of the extremely high level of unemployment. In mid-1995, it was estimated that between 40 and 50 per cent of the labour force were either unemployed or underemployed³⁴. As well as being a huge social and economic problem, this may have serious political implications. Again there is a serious need for improved foreign relations with the Gulf states.

Government spending must be kept under tight control. The difficulty here is that reductions in subsidies are likely to be politically unpopular, and that patronage spending is likely to continue. In addition, the situation has been exacerbated by an uncontrolled presidential budget and on going high scaling down of military spending³⁵.

There is a desperate need for aid from the IMF and the World Bank, although this depends on the restructuring and stabilisation of the Yemeni economy. In December 1995 and January 1996 a package of reforms and measures was agreed by the government and the international institutions and by the January 1996, both sides declared themselves moderately confident about the chances of the package proving successful. This agreement holds out significant promise for further liberalisation of the economy and investment conditions. The government promised that some 15 to 20 public enterprises would be privatised with a reduction of some 60,000 public employees, and also subsidies on energy, water, health and education would be reduced³⁶.

Oil production in 1997 might be expanded to 400,000 b/d, with the government receiving 40 per cent of its revenues. However, it seems clear that the government's share of oil revenue would remain at under $1 billion in 1997³⁷. Taking into account the modest production, modest proven reserves, generous acquisition of oil by the companies and the uncertainty of the expectations of the liquidation of natural gas project, it is clear that oil on its own cannot be the answer to the Yemen's problems.

Outside the hydrocarbons sector, and apart from the potential of fishing which has remained till now seriously underdeveloped, it is clear that in the longer term what is required is economic diversification and the growth of industry. It is important that the country promotes production for export as well as attracting expatriate and foreign investment.

Potentiality for the creation of a strong state

According to Migdal [271-77] there are four conditions which are prerequisites for the creation of a strong state: world historical timing, military threat, a basis for an independent bureaucracy and a skilful leadership. With regards to the Yemen, the first two conditions have been accomplished, but the latter two do not yet exist.

The historical moment was created by the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and the emergence of a single world order; a high level of Arab co-operation and solidarity in the first half of 1990, which allowed Saudi Arabia to see Yemen unification in a more positive light. These contributed crucially to the existence of the unified Yemen as it stands as an historical moment. At this point, the external political forces favoured concentrated and streamlined social control under a unified regime, which would make a good ally.

This was cemented by a vulnerability in both former Yemeni regimes under the pressure of their financial deficiencies. A provisional economic gain from the mutual ownership of oilfields made them more enthusiastic to proceed towards unity.

In addition, to the popularity of the idea of unity among the people. The unification in itself provided the opportunity for an aggregation of power and resources, especially as economic disparities were negligible. Finally, this led to the merger of the two states as the first step towards the creation of a strong state.

The military threat arose from within, rather than from outside, namely, from the power struggle between the GPC and the YSP, through which the leaders were motivated to consolidate their power. The victory of President Salih was a further step towards the creation of a strong state. Although possibly at the expense of democracy, it enabled the regime to assume and concentrate power. It was assumed that had the YSP won the war, the cost would have been much higher, because of the disparity in population, for the resistance would have weakened the state. In contrast, despite grievances and frustration, the majority of the people supported the unification and were incorporated into the new way of life. Therefore, the war of 1994 led to a concentration of control and power instead of dispersal, one of the prerequisites for the creation of a strong state.

Paradoxically, there exists neither skilful top leadership nor any social groupings (such as a cadre with skills) independent of the existing bases of social control. These two strata are not clearly distinguished in Yemen. The structure of control that exists today is largely the same as the one that predominated in the YAR before unification. Inevitably some features have changed. For instance, with unification, the area and the population of the state increased, and there was an increase in the revenues from the acquisition of the resources of the South. Also, a manipulated democracy was adopted. Apart from these adjustments, the structure of control remained much the same as it had been under the old coalition in the YAR.

After the 1962 revolution in the North (YAR), a civil war erupted between the royalists and the republicans. Both sides called on the tribes for support, thus creating a critical moment for the tribes with the potential to restore their power. Since then, the tribes have found themselves in a favourable position to maintain their political and military autonomy vis-à-vis the state [Peterson, 1982: 174]. Long after the war ended, the tribes remained heavily armed, with the respective governments have found themselves managing rather than governing the tribes. The tribal Shaykhs constituted a key political elite, who controlled the linkage between the tribesmen and the state. Therefore, Shaykhs were getting a financial payment from the state in order to maintained social stability, while at the same time they were also receiving another revenues from Saudi Arabia for that country's own political ends [Dresch, 1989: 19]. Furthermore, the regime in the YAR co-opted the Shaykhs, who represented key power centres, into the cabinet, the Advisory Council and the army [Peterson: 183]. Drawing on huge revenues, the Shaykhs participated in business and trade these with other entrepreneurs and merchants, who managed the business, while the Shaykhs retained their status and positions as both tribal leaders and government officials [al-Wazir: 176].

A triangle of accommodation has been created at the centre, consisting of military leaders, the most powerful of the Shaykhs and the influential merchants. Initially, the regime had tried to neutralise the power of the Shaykhs, but later found it expedient to involve them. By this means, the Shaykhs gained massive influence based on power and wealth. The merchants gained through preferential deals with the state and being able to flout the law and regulations. Paul Dresch has called this structure of control the "military-tribal-commercial complex"³⁸.

There are also middle-ranking Shaykhs, connected with the people and extremely honest. The government and the top Shaykhs depend on them for the implementation of their policies³⁹ in co-operation with the middle-level of officials, who are the working intermediaries. This stratum does not form part of the complex, but is rather one of its tools and sometimes its victims. These middle Shaykhs and officials compete for ties with the centre to acquired wealth and power. The ruling complex, however, prevents the accumulation of wealth and power outside its own ranks by instigating tribal disputes⁴⁰, a move which depletes the wealth of the middle Shaykhs and exhausts their power. This leaves these intermediaries in need of connections with the centre in an endless and vicious circle. The centre also uses its power of appointment and dismissal to prevent the middle-level officials from consolidating their power. However, because of the modest state presence at the local level, this accommodation process have not been very effective.

After the war of 1994, the previous structure of control was expanded to cover the whole of the unified Yemen. The changes that took place included the incorporation of some influential southern figures into the dominated complex. It is worth noting that with the exception of the military ruling group, the dominated complex has not drawn from any particular tribe or province, but tribal parochialism has been replaced by nepotism and corruption⁴¹.

With such a context, the state has both strong and weak characteristics existing at the same time. It is strong, mainly in the urban areas, in its penetration of society and in maintaining control, but it is weak in carrying out expected functions, such as providing good health care, reasonable education, social security and so on. The weak production base, exploration of oil and poor development plans mean that the government prefers to continue as a rentier economy. A large share of the state's revenues has gone to fuel the means of violence, such as the army, security forces and the PSO. This is accompanied by the excessive spending of the President, which is vital for the survival of the regime, but means that the government has failed to accomplish its development plan because of the financial shortages. However, the elections of 1997 gave such a majority to the GPC under President Salih, that the blame for failure can no longer be shifted onto other shoulders. Unless the government can be seen to achieve some success in the alleviation of poverty, decreasing of inflation and the rate of unemployment, sustaining the regime's strategy for control will be difficult.

Copyright © Ahmed Abdel-Karim Saif 1998