PREVIOUS CHAPTER

Conclusion
Acknowledgements
Abbreviations
Appendix
Bibliography

AS IT has been observed, Yemeni politics during the period 1990-97 were characterised by discontinuity in terms of their methods and their targets. Whereas, the politics of survival predominated during the first four years of the unification 1990-94, ending with the defeat of the YSP. A consociational/corporatist policies have prevailed from 1994 onwards.

The main point that one should notice is that consociational/corporatism is not a new policy adopted in the Yemen. If one imagines the policy as a line extending from the beginning of President Salih's rule in 1978 up to 1997, it will be observed that corporatism has been a main policy throughout that streamline. This streamline was interrupted only during the period 1990-94, after which all its previous characteristics were restored.

Nevertheless, some variables, which did not exist before, such as manipulated democracy, the evolution of civic organisations, changes of demographic features of the state and the adaptation of structural adjustment, were introduced into the Yemeni political scene. These variables might create a modified consociational/corporatism, which might include some new groups and/or exclude others. Also, by changing the institutional base, on which corporatism was previously dependent, the above mentioned variables had developed an expanded institutional structure that could push towards new forms of coalition.

For this reason, although Migdal's approach was an impressive tool, useful for the understanding of Yemeni politics between 1990 and 94, it has shortcomings in explaining Yemeni politics in ensuing years. Inevitably ,therefore, an approach must be sought to fill the gaps left by Migdal's. Therefore, in addition to Migdal the approaches of Bianchi, Ayubi and Dresch might be found suitable for the creation of a skilful perspective in the explanation of Yemeni politics.

Migdal provides a proficient tool for explaining some aspects of Yemeni politics. For example, his approach exhibits the duality of the state of Yemen, where the strength of the state can be seen in its ability to maintain social control. Alongside the weakness of the state, which may be seen in its failure to achieve social change, to carry out effective administrative functions and to provide adequate social services.

Migdal's approach does give a detailed explanation of the politics of survival, the main politics in Yemen for the period 1990-94. This approach, therefore, is appropriate for a political analysis of that period. For example, a physical model, that had been applied excessively during these years, is that where a state agency creates centrifugal tendencies within itself while the leaders attempt to counterbalance these tendencies by creating centripetal forces. As has been seen, the GPC and the YSP, rivals for power, both adopted this model in order to consolidate its own power and to weaken the rival's power. President Salih used this method skilfully, enhanced with his monopoly of state resources and his use of rewards and sanctions to cause fragmentation and to create dessintions within the YSP.

All three types of action constituting the politics of survival had been used: the big shuffle, nonmerit appointment and dirty tricks. The big shuffle, occurs when the leader has the power to appoint to or dismiss from office. Both the ruling partners, the GPC and the YSP were in competition for the important government posts. Despite the formula for sharing power, that they had both agreed to, there grew up a tacit rivalry by which one impeded the other, and each of the partners tried to manipulate the organisation of the state for its own political interest.

The second action in the politics of survival is the nonmerit appointment, where the only criteria for making an appointments is personal loyalty. This method was used mainly by the President, who relied on patronage and client ties that he had inherited from the YAR. So, key posts in the government were occupied either by President's relatives or by persons loyal to him, mostly from the Sanhan and Hamdan tribes, who are part of the Hashid tribal confederation. Relatively, the YSP lacked power in this kind of political action, because of its ideological platform and its organisational structure, which thus minimised the concentration of power in certain tribe or province.

The third action, dirty tricks, includes illegal methods of removing rivals. Although these methods, mainly assassinations, were used by both the GPC and the YSP, the YSP was the bigger loser because of the involvement of a third party, the YRR. The YRR was the ally of the GPC and it was accused by the YSP for the most assassinations that were laid against the YSP's members. This gave the GPC a great advantage, appear to be a mediator, although in reality they were who running the show.

In addition, as Migdal has explained the accommodation process, it takes place on two different levels. In the first level, the top state leadership accommodates two kinds of social control: the first, is when local strongmen are allowed to develop social control in order to gain social stability at a local level; the second is through power centres at national level, in which the leaders conduct their dealings through discriminatory and/or preferential policies.

The second level of accommodation takes place at local and regional levels, where the implementors of state policies, their supervisors and local strongmen accommodate one another in a web of political, economic and social exchange.

This accommodation concept contributes to the explanation of the way that state policies in the Yemen have been distorted and the resources redirected as they filter down to society. The predomination of the politics of survival forced the rivals to become involve in the accommodation process.

The GPC and the YSP were competing to consolidate their power and to mobilise people, which led to their strengthening their ties with different influential groups and individuals. Whereas the YSP neither re-incorporated the ex-Southern powers nor achieved loyalty of Northern power centres, the GPC had a well established network of interdependent military, tribal, commercial and religious interests. This was strengthened by incorporating those southern powers, that the YSP had failed to incorporate or was not interested in.

Nevertheless, the balance between the rivals created a sort of accommodation, involved groups without sufficient influence, which would otherwise not be involved. After the threat of the YSP was removed, such groups failed to sustain their privileged relations with the centre. These groups included the middle Shaykhs, local notables in the peripheries, intellectuals, workers and peasants. This accommodation process was not effective because of the modest presence of the state at the peripheries.

Despite the usefulness of Migdal's approach, it leaves gaps in the understanding of Yemeni politics. For example, it fails explain the discontinuity of accommodation in the peripheries. Also, it is deficient in elaborating the politics of the post-war period 1994-97, during which the politics of survival diminished as a result of the YSP defeat. In addition, this approach does not explain determinants of the different coalitions or the changes that took place during the time of transition from one mode of production to another, or the situation under the pressure of structural adjustment where the need for modernisation is concomitant with an awareness of the need for maintaining control.

The shortcomings of Migdal's approach might in part be overcome by the concept of corporatism. Although, Migdal has sketched the corporatism in his theory, but Bianchi [1989] has clarified it in details.

Bianchi deals with the continual formation of new associations and organised interest groups and the various attempts to mould them into some coherent or manipulated pattern of political representation. Yemeni politics are greatly influenced by the presence of actors and groups emerged as a result of the conciliation between the royalists and the republicans in the early 1970s. President Salih, who himself assumed power in 1978 reflected the interests of these actors and groups. So, the victory of Salih in 1994 has entailed the continuation of the pre-unification interests.

For this reason, Yemen ended up with a situation of a compartmentalised politics, where the state policies impeded by special interests. This has resulted in a strategic compromise, a system of corporate pluralism, which involves endless bargains made between the regime and the leadership of individual groups. Subsequently, results in an increasing incoherence of policies and institutions, but prevents the emergence of strong interest group coalitions or of a united opposition.

However, a limited development of associations in Yemen makes the different interests represented through personal contacts, patronage or client ties. Ayubi's approach of consociational/corporatism, enhances the analysis here. Ayubi [1995] asserts, that it is not true, as modernisation theories claim, that political integration and state building can only take place through the eradication of traditional solidarities and intermediary linkages. Patronage and bureaucratic linkages are not necessarily alternative, they can go hand in hand. In corporatism generally, individuals and classes do not interact with the state directly, but rather through intermediaries.

Ayubi defines consociation as a grand coalition based on high internal autonomy, with a proportionate measure of representation and mutual veto [Ayubi: 190]. Thus, he assumes the premise that consociational/corporatism is based on a collaborative rather than a conflictual approach. It is probably more typical of articulatory periods during which class or group hegemony is not possible.

The formula of corporatism in the Yemen after 1994 gives the appearance of avoiding disastrous conflicts between the GPC and the YRR, where it has solved the problem of the power distribution and modernisation without the sacrifice of the identity of the society. This formula appears to be convenient for elites wishing to initiate modernisation, while controlling its form and direction.

Notwithstanding, that corporatism in Yemen tends to be community-centred, which emerged in conditions of early modernisation, representing an attempt to involve pre-capitalist social groupings in which classes were not yet well defined yet. By this means, the consociational/corporatism formula ends with a weak state, which embedded in its social environment and impeded by contradictory interests.

In the Yemeni situation, the military group was dominant and applied a policy of differential incorporation to other groups, such as the tribal Shaykhs and merchants. For this reason, it may prove useful to use the approach of Dresch, who describes a military-commercial complex.

Dresch [1995: 34] indicates, that the GPC was established in the North, at the beginning of the 1980s, as an alternative to party politics. It was intended that local committees should elect regional committees, and the whole would culminate in a national committee structure, which would reflect the will of the people. Very rapidly, however, the system came to work from the top-down, through an elaborative system of patronage, opposite to the intended direction. The state became corrupt, turning into and a family business. Power centres developed around the military family, which were strongly linked to the centre by interdependent interests. This is what Dresch called a military-commercial complex. High-ranking army officers, important Shaykhs and a few great merchant families all had their hands in each other's pockets, and between them they had the state under their control.

In order to understand how this complex evolved, it should be borne in mind that, historically, in pre-unification period, North Yemen witnessed two types of economic system. The first, predominated in Lower Yemen, a semi-feudal system existed, in which the tribal leaders owned the arable land and tribesmen were obliged under their need to work on this land. This meant, that the wealth was concentrated in the hands of the leaders , and it explains the spread of progressive social thought in this part of Yemen.

The second type, predominated in Upper Yemen, where a pastoral economic system existed, where in the tribal leaders owned no more land than any other tribesman. In this case, the leader's power was derived from an unwritten code of practice, which was inherited and passed from generation to generation, whereby tribesmen owed loyalty to the leader and were expected to obey and support him. Later in 1970, the reconciliation between royalists and republicans gave the tribal leaders of Upper Yemen power gained from wealth derived from their access to state resources through their government posts.

Therefore, the tribal leaders of both Upper and Lower Yemen had a vested interest in maintaining the status quo, which is why they have always resisted any programme that might restrict their power. This stance has also been reinforced by external support.

When President Salih seized power in 1978, he appeared to be continuing on the same broad course that President Hamdi laid out of state building, institutionalisation and the leading role of the state in promoting socio-economic development. President Salih, however, retreated from pursuing these programmes of development in order to escape the same fate as Hamdi, who was assassinated in 1977. In part, this explains why the nation-state building still lags far behind.

There are two main points, that clarify the structure of military-commercial complex. The first, is that the tribes and the government are not separate entities, where the tribesmen hold governmental jobs, but the tribal leaders are prominent in the state apparatus.

The second point, is that the majority of the people of Yemen are from tribal origins and are most of them deprived, even those whose leaders hold high posts in government. This shows that the co-optation of tribal leaders into the state apparatus does not necessarily lead to benefits for their tribes.

During the last decade, a filtration process has taken place, which has resulted in narrowing the circle of the complex. In other word, confine the influence of wealth and authority on a less number of actors and groups as much as possible. Also, the centre has dealt with other actors and groups through intermediaries. Two results have ensued; the first, is that there has been a concentration of power and wealth in the hands of high-ranking army officers, the most influential Shaykhs and a few commercial families. The second result, was the distancing of the President from his constituents leading to a reduction in his popularity as well as the distancing of the major Shaykhs from their followers.

It is ironic that heritage and culture were based on morals, which ensured that individuals gave respect and obedience to their Shaykhs, even when these leaders sought benefits for themselves at the expense of their followers.

This potential power of the Shaykhs was the driving force behind the President's attempt to control the army through tightly knit connections. For example, President Salih's brother Muhammad commands Central Security, his half-brother Ali Salih Abdullah is in charge of the Republican Guards, Muhammad Salih runs the air force, Ali Muhsin Salih the First Armoured Division, and so on. The North Yemen, therefore, entered the unification, where this complex was the genuine ruling structure and after the defeat of the YSP in 1994, this complex has retained its efficacy.

With regard to the domestic balance, it is naive to assume that the President has the power to implement policies, that might disaffect the power centres. The President has neither the sufficient power, nor the inclination to risk losing their support. Coalescence of the military-commercial complex, however, has been cemented by two factors. The first, was the exposure to an external threat such as that posed by the YSP.

The second, was the existence of interdependent interests, where the commercial part of the ruling complex has managed the assets and maximised the profits of tribal and military parts of the complex. Also, the commercial part has been used by the authority to balance the exchange rates and to stabilise the economy. At the same time, the tribal part of the complex has guaranteed social stability, while the military part of the ruling complex has provided the tribal and the commercial parts with the needed protection and using official influence for their own interests.

Despite the successful working of this strategy, there are two factors that could lead to the break down of this coalition. The first, as al-Wazir [1988] points out, that there is a reveres relationships between the power of the army and the power of the Shaykhs. As the army grows in strength, so the Shaykhs weaken and vice versa. The tribal part of the complex, therefore, is keeping an eye on the army, but lack the ability to influence it. The Shaykhs do believe, that once the army reaches a certain level of power, then the President will topple them.

The second, is the economic development. Before unification the government relied on neighbouring states to give financial support to the Central Bank. Moreover, the workers remittances were participated in the relief of poverty. But after the union in 1990, such hand outs from Yemen's neighbours came only at a very high price politically. Also, the repatriation of workers from the Gulf states after the Gulf crisis deepened the financial crisis of the government. This has been exacerbated by the prevalence of corruption and mismanagement.

Therefore, unless achieving an economic progress, which can alleviate poverty and decreases the rates of inflation and unemployment, it will be difficult to sustain a strategy that will retain control of the military-commercial complex.

Finally, the package of perspectives must include: Migdal's, Ayubi's, Bianchi's and Dresch's approaches in order to produce an understandable and logical analysis of Yemeni politics. Using but a single approach would provide only a partial picture of what appears to be a dense and complicated forest.

For a long time, I have been interested in this subject. I hope to have gained a satisfactory understanding of Yemeni politics and to have reached a deep level of analysis beyond the direct occurrence of events. It has, therefore, been a profitable opportunity to have spent the past six months in this study. During this time, I was ably directed by a supportive supervisor, and so, my deep gratitude goes to Dr. Bruce Stanley, whose patience encouraged me to express my ideas, to discuss and to object. He would raise a key issue and then watch my responses, as when a stone is thrown into a lake resulting in a sequence of circular waves. Once again, many thanks to him.

I also extend my gratitude to Paul Auchterlonie, the assistant librarian at the old library of the University of Exeter for his valued assistance. My friend Glience, also offered helpful linguistic comments, which I deeply appreciate.

I extend additional thanks to the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) University of London, for letting me use their library, especially, the BBC collection. I am also grateful to different Yemeni political parties, who provided me a regular issues of their publications, which were helpful.

Finally, a special debt of gratitude is due to my parents, who despite their need of my help have encouraged me to achieve my degree.

The most important Yemeni political parties

Source : Liberty, BM Freedom, London, Report April, 21 1993.

Abbr: Pres = The President; Sh = Shaykh; Dr = Doctor; Jud = Judge

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Copyright © Ahmed Abdel-Karim Saif 1998